



MNPD’s Response Times, Caseloads, and Clearance Rates: Informational Report

Background

The response times for the Metro Nashville Police (MNPD) for almost all call types are increasing at a rapid rate, which has important public safety implications for the city. Long response times create a twofold issue: first of public perception (i.e., the public not believing that police will respond promptly), and second from a safety perspective, as certain call types demand quick response times in the interest of public safety. This must be considered in a context in which clearance rates for crimes, particularly violent crimes, are declining nationally. At its January 25, 2023, Board Meeting, the Chair of the Community Oversight Board (COB) requested that the Research Team prepare a report that compares historical police response times with the historical clearance rates and caseloads of the Department, split by offense category and unit, respectively. This approach attempts to explore several factors that might be inflating police response times. At present, this report does not make any recommendations, and is instead intended to provide COB members with context on this complex phenomenon.

Response Times

It’s clear that response times are a national issue, but they are a particular problem in Nashville. Data analyst Jeff Asher conducted an analysis¹ of law enforcement agencies that publish Calls for Service data with enough information to calculate response times, and found 1) that Nashville had the second largest increase in response times from 2019-2022, and 2) the third longest overall response time in 2022:


Year	2019	2020	2021	2022	Change
New Orleans	50.8	83.6	97.2	145.8	+95.0
Nashville	44.2	40.3	57.8	73.8	+29.6
Portland	26.6	37.5	40.4	48.6	+22.0
New York	18.0	17.3	30.2	33.0	+15.0
Seattle	48.9	42.6	55.6	61.8	+12.8
San Francisco	65.9	58.7	66.9	78.5	+12.5
Sacramento	54.0	48.9	60.0	63.7	+9.7
Detroit	31.4	31.5	33.8	40.4	+9.0
Virginia Beach	22.1	21.5	23.8	29.8	+7.7
Gilbert	21.9	20.0	22.5	25.8	+3.9
Montgomery County	23.0	20.1	22.3	25.3	+2.4
Boise	21.5	23.8	24.6	23.0	+1.5
Chandler	20.8	20.5	22.2	22.0	+1.1
Mesa	8.0	7.8	8.9	8.8	+0.9
Cincinnati	22.9	20.8	22.5	22.2	-0.7

Data per Jeff Asher¹

¹ Asher is a nationally recognized data analyst with expertise in evaluating criminal justice data. He co-founded AH Datalytics, a company that specializes in assisting communities and law enforcement agencies across the country use analytics. See: <https://bit.ly/3lh0bKG>

MNPD’s call response time for all call types has increased since 2018, though this effect is most dramatic for routine and urgent calls as compared to emergency calls²:

- Response time for emergency calls has increased from a low of 10.7 mins in 2020 to a high of 15.0 in 2022.
- Response time for urgent calls has increased from a low of 35.5 mins in 2020 to a high of 64.2 in 2022.
- Response time for routine calls has increased from a low of 66.3 mins in 2020 to 129.3 in 2022.




Year	Average Response Time (All Codes)	Average Response Time (Code 1 - Routine)	Average Response Time (Code 2 - Urgent)	Average Response Time (Code 3 - Emergency)
2018	44.9	76.7	37.3	11.0
2019	44.2	73.2	38.1	11.1
2020	40.3	66.3	35.5	10.7
2021	57.8	98.6	50.3	12.5
2022	73.3	129.3	64.2	15.0

While officer travel time has increased slightly since 2020, the increase in overall call response time is largely driven by a caller’s average time in queue. This increase could itself be driven both by slower response times by EMS dispatch and/or by longer response times from MNPD officers available to respond to a call:

² All data on response times per MNPD’s data dashboard: <https://www.nashville.gov/departments/police/data-dashboard/response-time>


Call Response Time by Dispatch Element



Year	Average Response Time (All Codes)	Average Time in Queue	Average Travel Time
2018	44.9	31.9	13.0
2019	44.2	31.3	12.9
2020	40.3	28.0	12.3
2021	57.8	43.9	13.9
2022	73.3	57.3	16.1


Response times for all violent calls have seen increases over the last three years, though shootings have seen the most dramatic increase in response times, predominantly from 2021-22:

Call Response Time for Violent Calls




Year	Holdup / Robbery	Shooting	Shots Fired	Person With Weapon	Domestic Disturbance	Fight / Assault	Rape
2018	11.5	12.7	16.1	20.6	40.0	40.8	43.3
2019	12.9	10.3	17.3	21.2	42.1	41.3	44.2
2020	11.9	10.4	18.9	19.2	38.0	37.4	38.9
2021	18.1	12.1	24.2	28.7	52.3	58.2	57.6
2022	23.9	30.8	35.9	37.5	68.5	80.5	69.8

Response time for all traffic calls has increased, though response time for vehicles blocking the right of way has increased the most dramatically, almost doubling from 2020 to 2022:




Year	Vehicle Crash - Personal Injury	Safety Hazard	Vehicle Blocking Right of Way
2018	16.1	28.3	70.1
2019	15.1	28.1	68.4
2020	13.9	29.6	64.9
2021	16.6	35.3	98.1
2022	20.8	40.8	124.0

Response time for all property calls has increased, though response time for thefts has increased the most dramatically, nearly doubling from 2020 to 2022:



Year	Fire	Burglary – Non-Residence	Burglary – Residence	Vehicle Crash – Property Damage	Theft
2018		29.8	40.4	43.2	87.2
2019	15.0	29.9	43.6	43.9	83.7
2020	15.7	29.0	42.4	41.3	72.8
2021	18.6	43.0	61.4	57.8	112.6
2022	23.6	51.4	78.6	81.3	139.3


Calls for disorder or missing persons have all shown similar increases in response times:




Year	Person Screaming	Person Indecently Exposed	Suspicious Person	Prowler	Disorderly Person	Criminal Vice Activity	Missing Person
2018	32.7	35.5	37.4	42.6	44.8	51.7	64.9
2019	28.8	37.0	37.0	44.1	44.9	56.0	67.6
2020	37.7	35.5	35.5	39.3	40.9	48.9	56.5
2021	50.3	52.8	47.9	50.2	60.8	74.1	82.1
2022	55.2	64.7	57.6	69.0	75.1	93.3	108.5

While all non-criminal calls have seen an average increase in call response time, response times requesting an officer for an investigation have increased the most steeply over the last several years. Further, all calls for mental health and substance use have seen sharp increases in response times:

Call Response Time for Non-Criminal Calls




Call Response Time for Mental Health and Substance Use Calls



Year	Corpse / DOA	Want Officer for Investigation	Dangerous / Injured Animal	Suicidal Person	Intoxicated Person	Mentally Ill Person
2018	12.3	52.6	54.1	24.4	26.0	26.8
2019	11.4	49.6	51.1	27.1	29.1	31.3
2020	11.6	44.9	49.4	21.9	27.9	27.2
2021	14.4	63.3	58.8	32.1	44.9	37.8
2022	16.7	82.5	60.3	37.3	46.8	43.0


Clearance Rates³

MNPD’s clearance rates are declining across all violent crime, reaching lows in 2021. This is not entirely surprising, since crimes are often cleared the following calendar year and 2022 data has not yet been released. MNPD’s clearance rates for all violent crimes are below, after which national rates are integrated:



Year	MNPD Homicide Clearance Rate	MNPD Rape Clearance Rate	MNPD Robbery Clearance Rate	MNPD Agg. Assault Clearance Rate	MNPD All Violent Crime Clearance Rate
2018	73.03	35.45	15.54	49.34	39.36
2019	61.18	57.97	15.53	45.45	38.46
2020	43.36	41.56	8.32	31.83	27.32
2021	39.39	24.5	13.83	38.32	32.8


MNPD’s clearance rates for homicides have roughly followed national clearance rates:



Year	MNPD Homicide Clearance Rate	National Homicide Clearance Rate
2018	73.03	62.3
2019	61.18	61.4
2020	43.36	49.8
2021	39.39	42.4


³ All clearance rate data from the FBI’s NCR, NIBRS datasets: <https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/more-fbi-services-and-information/ucr>

MNPD has consistently had higher clearance rates for rape than the national average, though that gap shrank in 2021:




Year	MNPD Rape Clearance Rate	National Rape Clearance Rate
2018	35.45	33.4
2019	57.97	32.9
2020	41.56	23.5
2021	24.5	21.7

MNPD has consistently had lower clearance rates for aggravated assault than the national average, though that gap shrank in 2021:



Year	MNPD Agg. Assault Clearance Rate	National Agg. Assault Clearance Rate
2018	49.34	52.5
2019	45.45	52.3
2020	31.83	44.4
2021	38.32	42.4

MNPD has consistently had lower clearance rates for robbery than the national average, though that gap shrank in 2021 as national rates sharply declined and MNPD returned near their average:



Year	MNPD Robbery Clearance Rate	National Robbery Clearance Rate
2018	15.54	30.4
2019	15.53	30.5
2020	8.32	30
2021	13.83	23.6

Response Times and Clearance Rates

The level of aggregation of both response time and clearance rate data prevents meaningful statistical comparison of one's influence on the other. On aggregate and in general, however, MNPDP's response times are increasing while clearance rates are decreasing. While there are myriad explanations for either phenomenon, there is empirical evidence linking the two together. Research from Blanes i Vidal and Tom Kirchmaier⁴ found that a 10% increase in police response time led to a nearly 5% decrease in the likelihood of crime clearance. They suggest that this may occur due to quicker response times enabling witness identification, evidence collection, and thus the greater chance of arrest.

This, however, flies in the face of a more traditional criminological theory that suggests that clearance is not meaningfully impacted by response time unless police respond incredibly quickly (i.e., under one minute from the crime occurring⁵, which is an unreasonable expectation for even the most efficient department). Other critics suggest that natural delays in notification, both in terms of an expedient 911 call and in terms of dispatch speed, are such that police response time is not a meaningful factor in explaining clearance rates⁶. To this point, data from MNPDP shows that even if police were to be informed seconds after a crime occurred, on average, an officer would spend 16 minutes traveling.

Perhaps the most obvious recourse suggested to longer response times is to hire more officers, a suggestion that may make intuitive sense but is not wholly supported by empirical evidence. While some research suggests that as the officer staffing rate of a police department increases, response time generally decreases⁷, other research challenges whether this decrease matters. Research across 50 of the largest US cities shows that there is no evidence that more officers have any impact on homicide clearances⁸, and that increasing police funding does not lead to material differences in clearance rates for violent crimes such as homicide⁹. More funding may thus not be the answer to solving more crimes, especially because the willingness of witnesses to come forward (which itself is impacted by distrust in the police, social disadvantage, and community engagement) is one of the biggest factors in clearing crimes such as homicides⁹. This trust cannot be built simply with more officers.

These concerns must be altogether considered within the context of empirical critique of clearance rates. Among other arguments, critics argue that clearance rates are a poor performance metric for police efficacy in that they lead to an overemphasis on arrests without a corresponding emphasis on solving crimes. Clearance rates must thus be further unpacked based on jurisdictional and incident characteristics including police workload, firearm use, distant victim-offender relationship, race of victim and offender, and more. Scholars have accordingly attempted to create a more comprehensive criminal accountability metric that incorporates clearance rates, reported crimes, arrest rates, known crimes, conviction rates, imprisonment rates, and resolution rates¹⁰. All this to say, MNPDP and any other police department would do well to undertake a more comprehensive approach to crime resolution.

⁴ Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, and Tom Kirchmaier. "The effect of police response time on crime clearance rates." *The Review of Economic Studies* 85.2 (2018): 855-891.

⁵ Bayley, D. H. (1996), "Police for the Future", New York: Oxford University Press.

⁶ Sherman, L. W., and Eck, J. E. (2002), "Policing for Crime Prevention", in *Evidence-Based Crime Prevention*, London: Routledge.

⁷ Salimbene, Nicholas Andrew, and Yan Zhang. "An examination of organizational and community effects on police response time." *Policing: An International Journal* (2020).


⁸ Chalfin, A., Hansen, B., Weisburst, E., & Williams, M. (2022). Police force size and civilian race. *American Economic Review*, 4(2), 139-158.

⁹ Bjerk, David. "Does greater police funding help catch more murderers?" *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 19.3 (2022): 528-559.

¹⁰ Baughman, Shima B. "How effective are police? The problem of clearance rates and criminal accountability." *Ala. L. Rev.* 72 (2020): 47-114.

Caseloads

Another potential explanation for low clearance rates and long response times is investigative caseload. Research has validated the commonsense notion that the odds of clearing a crime decrease as the number of open cases for an investigator increases¹¹. A 2011 study using FBI data found that departments where investigators handled five or more homicide cases per year had an average clearance rate of 59.7%, compared to departments in which investigators handled less than five cases per year, where investigators had a 65.1% clearance rate¹², providing further evidence to this point. Interestingly, other research⁷ has demonstrated that the number of investigators is likely influenced by police budgets to a greater degree than other positions within police departments. The implication of this is that as police budgets are modified, departments are more likely to alter the number of investigators as compared to other types of officers.



Graph per Keel¹²

To interrogate the question of investigative caseload and clearance in Nashville, the below section attempts to quantify MNPDP's investigative caseload and clearance rates, based on information provided to MNCO staff by Commander Carlos Lara. It is not necessarily a comprehensive outline of MNPDP's investigative caseload and clearance rates, but rather an analysis of the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) incidents/data and investigative staffing details provided by Commander Lara.

Within MNPDP, there are two main bureaus that maintain investigative incident reports: the Community Services Bureau (blue in Table 1 below), and Investigative Services Bureau (orange in Table 1). Table 1 outlines the number of investigative staff in the two bureaus by precinct and unit.

¹¹ LoFaso, Charles A. "Solving homicides: The influence of neighborhood characteristics and investigator caseload." *Criminal Justice Review* 45.1 (2020): 84-103.

¹² Keel, T. G. (2011). *Detecting clues in homicide management: A homicide "best practices" research project*. Federal Bureau of Investigations, National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, Washington, DC.

Table 1: MNPD Staff Structure

MNPD Investigative Staff Breakdown	
Community Service Bureau	
Central Precinct	
Community Field Intelligence Team (CFIT) Unit	5
Investigations Unit	8
East Precinct	
CFIT Unit	5
Investigations Unit	8
Hermitage Precinct	
CFIT Unit	5
Investigations Unit	8
Madison Precinct	
CFIT Unit	5
Investigations Unit	8
Midtown Hills Precinct	
CFIT Unit	5
Investigations Unit	8
North Precinct	
CFIT Unit	5
Investigations Unit	8
South Precinct	
CFIT Unit	5
Investigations Unit	8
West Precinct	
CFIT Unit	5
Investigations Unit	8
Investigative Services Bureau	
Criminal Investigations Division	52
Interpersonal Crimes Branch	59
Specialized Investigations Division	8
Specialized Investigations Division-Special	53
Traffic	13
Violent Crimes Division	38


Active caseload was calculated using the average (designated as “Average” in Table 2) of a range between two different combinations of variables from the “2021 Part I UCR Incidents” dataset, designated as “Range A” and “Range B” for the bottom and top of the range respectively (see Table 2). “Range A” includes the columns: ‘No Record in Case Management, Incident Not Cleared, Filed’ and ‘No Record in Case Management, Incident Not Cleared, Other.’ “Range B” includes both prior columns, with the addition of ‘Case Management Other.’ ‘Case Management Other’ includes cases that are considered active (open), but is also more expansive, including cases that are inactive, outside of MNPD’s control, or closed. A range was thus necessary to capture the relevant data from the ‘Case Management Other’ column, while also acknowledging that not all the data counts towards active caseloads. While a range introduces some uncertainty, it is the most accurate method we could accomplish given the data we had.

We then examined the average case load (again see Table 2) using a range of measures from the “Investigative Unit” dataset. The first section of Table 2 examines MNPD’s average case load per officer on a department-wide level. The second section examines MNPD’s case load by bureau, specifically the Community Services Bureau and the Investigative Services Bureau. The third

section examines MNPD’s precincts, calculating the average caseload for the officers in the CFIT and investigation units for each precinct. Data for this step comes from pairing the “Precinct CFIT” and “Precinct Investigations” rows for each precinct.

Table 2: Average Case Load (Across 2021)

	Active Cases (Range A)	Active Cases (Range B)	Investigative Staff	Active Caseload (Range A)	Active Caseload (Range B)	Average
MNPD	12023	13750	321	37.45	42.83	40.17
Community Services Bureau	10418	11639	104	100.17	111.91	106.04
Investigative Services Bureau	1605	2111	217	7.40	9.73	8.57
Central Precinct	1284	1306	13	98.77	100.46	99.62
East Precinct	1005	1788	13	77.31	114.46	95.89
Hermitage Precinct	1453	1796	14	103.79	128.29	116.04
Madison Precinct	740	854	13	56.92	65.69	61.31
Midtown Precinct	1868	1928	13	143.69	148.31	146.00
North Precinct	1074	1137	14	76.71	81.21	78.96
South Precinct	1187	1272	12	98.92	106.00	102.46
West Precinct	1807	1858	12	150.58	154.83	152.71



Based on the data above, MNPD’s average active case load per investigative officer was 40.17 active cases per investigative officer in 2021. On the Bureau level, the average active was 106.04 active cases per investigative officer in the Community Services Bureau and 8.57 active cases per investigative officer in the Investigative Services Bureau. When broken down further by geographic precinct, the average active case load per investigative officer was 99.62 in the Central Precinct, 95.89 in the East Precinct, 116.04 in the Hermitage Precinct, 61.31 in the Madison Precinct, 146.00 in the Midtown Precinct, 78.96 in the North Precinct, 102.46 in the South Precinct, and 152.71 in the West Precinct.


While the average active caseload at the departmental level should typically set the benchmark for the average case load by unit, the initial breakdown of the averages on the Bureau level demonstrates a

wide disparity between officers in precincts versus officers assigned to investigative services. The disparate breakdown of averages extends further into the Community Services Bureau when broken down by precinct. Notably, the Madison Precinct makes up the bottom of the range by having the lowest average active caseload of 61.31 per officer, and the West Precinct has the highest average active caseload of 152.71 per investigative officer.

Clearance rates were calculated using the FBI’s National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) method of calculating clearance rates and the “2021 Part I UCR Incidents” dataset. NIBRS defines clearance rates as a percentage of total incidents, which is the national standard that MNPD follows for calculating their clearance rates. To identify MNPD’s clearance rates, we summed the columns “No Record in Case Management, Incident Cleared” and “Case management Cleared” and then divided their sum by column “Total Reports.”

Table 3: Clearance Rates


	Cleared Cases	Total Cases	Clearance Rate
MNPD	6091	33186	18.35%
Community Services Bureau	2550	23960	10.64%
Investigative Services Bureau	3541	9181	38.57%
Central Precinct	297	2436	12.19%
East Precinct	374	2485	15.05%
Hermitage Precinct	242	3767	6.42%
Madison Precinct	491	2448	20.06%
Midtown Precinct	254	3755	6.76%
North Precinct	221	2535	8.72%
South Precinct	384	3811	10.08%
West Precinct	287	2723	10.54%



MNPD’s average investigative clearance rate for the units and precincts given was 18.35% in 2021. At the Bureau level, the average clearance rate is 10.64% in the Community Services Bureau versus a 38.57% clearance rate in the Investigative Services Bureau. When broken down further by geographic precinct, the average clearance rates are 12.19% for the Central Precinct, 15.05% for the East Precinct, 6.42%, for the Hermitage Precinct, 20.06% for the Madison Precinct, 6.76% for the Midtown Precinct, 8.72% for the North Precinct, 10.08% for the South Precinct, and 10.54% for the West Precinct.

Similar to the average active caseloads per officer, MNPD’s clearance rates have a wide range of values. Interestingly, clearance rates appear to be inversely proportional to active caseloads, as the units and bureaus that have the lowest average case load per officer are also the ones with the higher clearance rates. This phenomenon is most obvious in the breakdown of bureaus between the Community Services Bureau and the Investigative Services Bureau and continues when examining the precincts as well. The Madison Precinct, which had the lowest active case load per officer, also has the highest clearance rate. Similarly, precincts that high higher than average caseloads, like the West Precinct, Midtown Precinct, and Hermitage Precincts, all have lower than average clearance rates. Thus, the active case load officers have likely impacts how successfully they can clear cases, reinforcing the findings of LoFaso¹¹ and Keel¹².

To investigate the potential relationship between clearance rates and average caseloads by MNPD department, we used a scatter plot graph comparing average case load and clearance rate. A logarithmic trendline with an R-squared value of 0.8992 was used to best capture the stark differences in average caseloads. While the data set is not big enough to determine statistical significance, the trend line helps visualize what the relationship between average caseloads and clearance rates look like. Based on the downward curve of the trendline and the R-squared value of 0.8992, the average case load size of an MNPD unit does appear to affect what the clearance rate for that unit will look like. Units that have smaller average caseloads are likely to have higher clearance rates, and conversely units with larger average caseloads are likely to have lower clearance rates.



Based on the literature surrounding clearance rates, factors such as the type of crime, the person reporting it, and the place it was reported in can all impact clearance rates. However, with the data we currently have access to, we do not have the capability to explore how those variables may affect clearance rates. Thus, further research will need to be conducted to determine if those factors have any weight in affecting MNPD clearance rates.

Patrol Officers

Another related explanation for slow response times is a lack of patrol officers. In non-peer reviewed research¹³, the International City County Managers Association has suggested a ‘Rule of 60’ regarding patrol officers. Simply put, the rule suggests that 1) 60% of the sworn officers in a department should be dedicated to patrol staffing, and 2) no more than 60% of their time should be committed to calls for service. If we assume that Field Training Officers (FTOs) count as patrol officers, MNPD has 511 patrol officers at the time of writing. Their total sworn headcount is 1424 (not including 57 trainees), meaning that they only have 36% of staff dedicated to patrol¹⁴. While the Rule of 60 isn’t to be treated as an absolute, such a big gap should raise a flag for the department.

The natural follow-up question is how MNPD compares to peer cities on this metric. This is a difficult question to answer on an agency-by-agency basis since most departments don’t release this data publicly. However, the DOJ recently released a report¹⁵ that outlines the primary job responsibility of full-time personnel in local police departments. For agencies that serve 100,000 or more residents, on average 62.5% of sworn officers are dedicated to patrol. This reveals a huge disparity for MNPD and provides evidence that the Rule of 60 has a basis of truth in modern policing.

While there have been numerous attempts to establish universally applicable staffing standards (for example, one of the most popular suggestions was that departments should have two officers per thousand residents), organizations like the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) have cautioned against¹⁶ using such blanket metrics, calling them “totally inappropriate as a basis for staffing decisions”. Instead of aiming to fit into predefined metrics such as these, MNCO believes it would be valuable for MNPD to collaborate with an external organization such as the City Auditor or an external consulting firm to conduct a workload/staffing analysis to better understand its patrol structure and mechanisms to improve officer distribution. Such an endeavor should consider the civilianization of some officer duties, which would free officers up to focus on patrol, investigations, and solving violent crime.

An effective example of this approach has been accomplished elsewhere; in 2017, the Matrix Consulting Group conducted a Workload/Staffing analysis¹⁷ of the Kansas City Police Department. In that report, they evaluated staffing allocation and deployment in each bureau of the department, its organizational structure, and the management systems used to control operations as well as ensure that departmental and community goals are met. Through the data, they were able to identify ‘patrol proactivity’ as an important metric, which they defined as the percentage of patrol officers’ time in which they are on duty, available, and not responding to calls for service. From this, they made specific recommendations,

¹³ https://icma.org/sites/default/files/305747_Analysis%20of%20Police%20Department%20Staffing%20_%20McCabe.pdf

¹⁴ Note that MNPD has an additional 12% of their staff dedicated to *supervision* of patrol (i.e., patrol sergeants and lieutenants).

¹⁵ <https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/local-police-departments-personnel-2020>

¹⁶ <https://www.theiacp.org/technical-assistance>

¹⁷ <https://www.kcmo.gov/Home/ShowDocument?id=2970>

including reallocating officers to patrol and reducing the functional areas in which sworn personnel were performing functions a civilian could conduct, or managing civilians within those areas.

Conclusion

Per the Mayor's FY23 Recommended Budget¹⁸, MNPDP was 'On Track' with its goal of a response time below six minutes for Code 3 Emergency calls. It is unclear how the Mayor and/or MNPDP came to this conclusion given that their publicly available data outlines that the average response time to a Code 3 call was 10.7 minutes in 2020, 12.5 minutes in 2021, and 15.0 minutes in 2022. Further, per an appendix¹⁹ to that same FY23 budget, in FY21, the Mayor reports that average receive to arrive time for an urgent call with emergency equipment was 10.9 minutes; the average receive to arrive time for an urgent call without emergency equipment was 43.2 minutes; and the average routine call took 77.9 minutes from call receipt to arrival. It is clear from these numbers that there is some disconnect regarding the performance metrics and benchmarks set for call response times.

Further exploring this discrepancy may provide satisfactory explanations for the phenomenon, but it's unlikely that MNPDP's response times are due to any one issue. The increase in response times is coupled with a decrease in clearance rates and disparate caseloads across precincts, and while we cannot definitively state that any of these phenomena are causal in the increasing response times, literature demonstrates that there may be a connection between them all. It therefore behooves both MNPDP and other outside agencies to further consider and research how these various concerns interact and influence one another.

With all this considered, MNCO urges further consideration of a) EMS call structure, b) performance goals and the department's achievement of such goals, c) MNPDP officer's system for call prioritization, d) patrol officer staffing, e) a workload/staffing analysis, f) clearance rates across unit and precinct, and g) community perception of whether their needs are being met by MNPDP and the Department of Emergency Communications (DEC).

¹⁸ Available at: <https://bit.ly/3MPIDOX>

¹⁹ Available at: <https://bit.ly/3OdZ6wu>