Nashville Community Review Board

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NCRB RESEARCH REPORT

# Policy Advisory Report: Analyzing MNPD Use of Force

October 26th, 2026

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## INTRODUCTION

The Nashville Community Review Board (NCRB) is committed to monitoring and evaluating the use of force by the Metro Nashville Police Department (MNPD). This publication serves as the second periodic review of police use of force in Nashville since the establishment of the NCRB in 2023. It is intended to provide the community with transparent and accessible information that supports the identification of trends and areas of concern. The NCRB believes this effort creates an opportunity to strengthen trust between the community and law enforcement through open dialogue and evidence-based recommendations.

The NCRB's practice of conducting periodic reviews of MNPD's use of force practices stems from broader national and local conversations on police accountability and community safety. These conversations intensified following a series of high-profile incidents of police use of force beginning in the mid-to-late 2010s, including the deaths of Michael Brown (Ferguson, MO, 2014), Eric Garner (New York City, NY, 2014), Freddie Gray (Baltimore, MD, 2015), Philando Castile (Falcon Heights, MN, 2016), and Alton Sterling (Baton Rouge, LA, 2016). In response, communities across the country called for stronger civilian oversight and more consistent monitoring of law enforcement practices (National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement [NACOLE], 2025a).

Locally, these concerns contributed to the formation of the Nashville Community Oversight Board (COB) in 2018 as an independent civilian oversight body. In 2023, Tennessee state legislation restructured Nashville's oversight system, dissolving the COB and establishing the NCRB, a body of city-appointed board members with revised authority and scope. Despite this structural transition, the practice of conducting and publishing periodic Use of Force analyses has continued under the NCRB as part of the Board's commitment to transparency and public accountability. In alignment with our values of transparency, accountability, trustworthiness, and integrity, the NCRB works to ensure that community voices remain central in discussions about policing practices.

The analyses included in this report draw on data retrieved from MNPD's publicly available Use of Force Dashboard. The dashboard is one of the department's public-facing data tools and provides information on reported use of force incidents, though classifications may be updated as investigations progress (Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, 2025). Our analyses examine the types of force used, the frequency of incidents, demographic patterns, geographic distribution, and any disparities among the demographics of subjects of force. We also explore the relationship between the level of subject resistance and the level of force applied. Our findings are presented through charts, tables, and narrative summaries to support interpretation of the data. Further, this review is guided by the following key questions, which frame the analysis of police use of force in Nashville:

- How many use of force incidents occur each year, and how are they distributed across police precincts?
- What types of subject resistance are most commonly reported (e.g., passive, active, or assaultive)?
- What types of force are most frequently used by officers, and how often do incidents escalate to higher levels of force?
- How often do officer injuries occur, and are they associated with particular resistance types or levels of force?
- What reasons do officers most commonly cite for using force, such as defense of self or defense of others?
- What are the demographic characteristics of officers involved in use of force incidents, including race, sex, and years of service?

The recommendations that follow are informed by our findings, alongside community feedback, and nationally recognized standards for law enforcement policy. They focus on reducing excessive use of force, strengthening reporting and training practices, and promoting approaches that prioritize de-escalation and accountability. The NCRB invites community members, policymakers, and law enforcement leadership to review the findings and engage in ongoing efforts to advance public safety and equity in Nashville.

## 1.1 Background and Broader Impact of Use of Force: Nashville Context

## 1.2 Historical Incidents and the Formation of Oversight

Historically, a small number of high-profile incidents have shaped public conversations in Nashville about police use of force and the need for oversight and accountability. On February 10, 2017, MNPD Officer Joshua Lippert fatally shot Jocques Clemmons during a foot pursuit. On July 26, 2018, MNPD Officer Andrew Delke fatally shot Daniel Hambrick, also during a foot pursuit. In the Clemmons case, the Nashville District Attorney's Office declined to pursue criminal charges (Associated Press, May 11, 2017). In contrast, Delke plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter in 2021 and received a three-year prison sentence (WPLN, 2021). Community members and advocacy groups cited these incidents as central to calls for reform, which contributed to the creation of the Nashville Community Oversight Board, the predecessor to the NCRB. These incidents prompted sustained public attention and institutional responses that extended beyond individual cases and into changes in oversight structures and reporting practices.

## 1.3 Policy Evolution and Reporting Requirements

In the years following the creation of the Community Oversight Board in Nashville, MNPD and Metro Council implemented changes to use of force reporting requirements, expanding documentation, transparency, and accountability. In 2019, MNPD began classifying firearm displays as a reportable use of force. In 2022, the department further expanded reporting requirements to include soft empty-hand control techniques, such as takedowns and pain compliance. This broadened the range of encounters classified as reportable uses of force and contributed to notable increases in reported incidents. As a result, upward trends during this period are largely reflective of changes in reporting standards.

In August 2021, MNPD launched publicly accessible data dashboards on its website, marking the first time the department made a centralized set of policing data available for public review. The dashboards provide information on police use of force, crime incidents, officer and subject demographics, vehicle stops, and other policing activities, with data available by zip code, precinct, and Metro Council district and updated daily through automated processes (Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, 2021). This development expanded public access to use of force data and created a foundation for ongoing review by the NCRB, local policymakers, and community members.

Policy evolution in Nashville also reflects influence from national reform frameworks. In June 2020, Metro Council members introduced legislation modeled on the "8 Can't Wait" framework developed by Campaign Zero, which emphasizes restrictions on high-risk force tactics, de-escalation, officer intervention, and comprehensive reporting (Campaign Zero, 2020; Crutchfield, 2020; Rau, 2020). That same month, MNPD published a formal comparison of its policies with the 8 Can't Wait principles and publicly affirmed alignment across all eight areas. MNPD policy explicitly emphasizes de-escalation as a foundational principle, prohibits chokeholds and neck restraints, restricts shooting at moving vehicles, requires warnings before the use of deadly force when feasible, and mandates adherence to a defined force continuum (Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, 2020b).

Notably, MNPD policy also codifies a duty to intervene, requiring officers to take verbal or physical action to prevent misconduct or excessive force by fellow officers and to report such interventions without delay (Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, 2020a). The department's policies state that failure to intervene or report misconduct may result in disciplinary action, with the category depending on the severity of the violation. These provisions position intervention and reporting as central components of police legitimacy and internal accountability.

More recently, in May 2024, Metro Council passed Ordinance BL2024-179 (Metropolitan Council of Nashville and Davidson County, 2024), amending Section 2.44.115 of the Metropolitan Code of Laws to require MNPD to submit quarterly use of force reports directly to the Council. The ordinance mandates expanded demographic and incident-level detail, including information on individuals subjected to force, the ages of minors involved, Taser discharges,

firearm displays, and subject injuries. Collectively, these legislative and policy actions reflect Nashville's ongoing efforts to institutionalize transparency and improve public access to information related to MNPD's use of force practices.

## 1.4 Patterns and Disparities in Use of Force

Analysis conducted by the NCRB, included in our most recent Use of Force report published in 2024, identified persistent racial, demographic, and spatial disparities in MNPD's reported use of force incidents (Nashville Community Review Board, 2024). Using a combination of descriptive analyses, benchmarking comparisons, and regression modeling, the NCRB assessed how use of force varies across subject characteristics, force types, geographic areas, and levels of subject resistance. These analyses do not establish causality but highlight patterns that warrant continued examination. A brief summary of those findings is included below, organized across four analytic dimensions: racial and demographic disparities, youth and school-related encounters, the relationship between force, resistance, and injury, and spatial concentration.

### 1.4.1 Racial and Demographic Disparities

NCRB analysis found that Black subjects experienced use of force at rates disproportionate to multiple comparison benchmarks, including population representation, arrest rates, and suspect rates. Hispanic subjects also experienced disproportionate levels of force when benchmarked against arrest and suspect data, even in cases where force appeared proportional to population estimates. These patterns indicate disparate impact rather than proof of discriminatory intent and underscore the importance of evaluating use of force using multiple comparative measures rather than population data alone.

Disaggregated analysis by force type revealed particularly pronounced disparities in firearm displays and soft empty-hand control techniques. Over the five-year study period from 2018 through 2022, officers displayed firearms against Black subjects at substantially higher rates than against white subjects, and officers used soft empty-hand control more frequently against Black subjects as well. These disparities became more visible after MNPD expanded reporting requirements in 2022 to include all soft empty-hand control techniques, including those that did not result in injury, highlighting the importance of comprehensive reporting in identifying patterns that were previously obscured.

### 1.4.2 Youth and School-Related Use of Force

Disparities were especially pronounced in incidents involving youth, a subset of encounters that raises distinct concerns given the developmental, educational, and long-term implications of police contact. Black and Hispanic youth experienced use of force at markedly higher rates than white youth across multiple force categories, including firearm displays and soft empty-hand control. Firearm displays against Black youth occurred at substantially higher rates relative to white youth, and soft empty-hand control was also disproportionately applied to Black youth. These disparities exceeded those observed in the overall dataset, indicating that youth of color experience particularly elevated exposure to police use of force.

To examine force used by School Resource Officers (SROs), NCRB employed a proxy methodology due to data limitations related to incident location reporting. Using this approach, the analysis found that the overwhelming majority of youth subjected to force by SROs were Black students, with female students comprising a disproportionate share of those incidents. NCRB emphasized that these findings are preliminary due to data constraints but raise concerns that warrant more precise data collection and continued monitoring.

### 1.4.3 Force, Resistance, and Injury

NCRB evaluated the relationship between subject resistance and officer use of force by comparing ranked levels of force and resistance. Regression analysis showed that resistance level is a significant predictor of force level, meaning that higher levels of resistance are generally associated with higher levels of force. However, the analysis also found that force was frequently used in incidents where no resistance was coded, particularly involving Black subjects. A

substantial share of Black subjects who experienced force were not recorded as resisting, a pattern that remained statistically significant across multiple models.

The analysis also identified disparities in injury outcomes. Officers who were white and male were more likely to use higher levels of force and to cause subject injury compared to non-white and non-male officers within the subset of officers who had used force. These findings provide additional context for understanding how officer characteristics, subject characteristics, and resistance interact in shaping use of force outcomes, while also underscoring the limitations of available data.

### 1.4.4 Spatial Concentration of Use of Force

NCRB's spatial analysis, an examination of where force incidents occur across the city, found that reported uses of force were concentrated in a limited number of Zones and Reporting Areas (RPAs), while many RPAs recorded no force incidents during the study period. When these geographic patterns were compared with census tract data, use of force incidents appeared more frequently in areas with higher proportions of non-white residents and residents living in poverty. The 2024 report notes that these patterns warrant continued examination of officer deployment practices and the structural conditions that shape policing environments. NCRB cautions that these findings reflect geographic correlation rather than proof of causation and should be interpreted in conjunction with broader research on residential segregation, deployment strategies, and historical policing patterns.

## 1.5 MNPD Responses to Oversight Reports

MNPD responses to use of force oversight reports have varied across reporting cycles and have included both formal rebuttal and programmatic engagement. Following the Community Oversight Board's use of force report in 2023 (Metro Nashville Community Oversight, 2023), MNPD issued a written rebuttal disputing the report's methodology, interpretation, and benchmarking approach (Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, 2023). In that response, the department argued that the report relied on a flawed sample, did not sufficiently normalize findings to the population "at risk" of experiencing force, and presented certain disparities using raw counts rather than rates. MNPD also emphasized that use of force incidents represent a small percentage of overall police–civilian interactions and highlighted departmental priorities related to organizational excellence, community engagement, and precision policing.

In its 2023 rebuttal, MNPD further raised concerns about resistance data coding, officer assignment changes over time, and the comparability of force categories following reporting modifications, particularly the expansion of soft empty-hand control documentation beginning in 2022. The department also disputed characterizations of deployment practices, stating that patrol allocation decisions are based on calls for service and workload balancing rather than predictive or algorithmic policing models.

As of the publication of this 2026 Use of Force report, MNPD has not issued a formal written response to the Board's 2024 use of force recommendations. The absence of a documented response limits the Board's ability to assess departmental alignment with those recommendations and underscores the importance of ongoing, transparent engagement between MNPD and the NCRB. The NCRB will continue to document departmental responses to oversight findings in future reporting cycles as part of its monitoring and accountability mandate.

## 1.6 Community Concerns and Social Impacts of Police Use of Force

Beyond departmental responses, police use of force carries broader and more enduring consequences for community well-being, public trust, and social cohesion. Community concerns about use of force extend beyond questions of data accuracy to include issues of legitimacy, perceived fairness, and the quality of relationships between law enforcement and the communities they serve. Research indicates that exposure to police use of force, particularly when perceived

as excessive or unjust, can contribute to fear, anxiety, anger, and long-term distrust of law enforcement, while also raising concerns about training, accountability, and decision-making practices (DeVylder et al., 2022).

National public health and social science organizations have increasingly recognized police violence as a critical issue with population-level consequences, citing disproportionate impacts on marginalized communities that include physical injury, psychological trauma, chronic stress, and loss of institutional trust (DeVylder et al., 2022). These effects are not limited to individuals directly involved in use of force incidents; families, neighborhoods, and broader communities may experience secondary harm, including reduced cooperation with law enforcement and diminished confidence in public institutions. These dynamics highlight the importance of examining police use of force not only as a matter of policy compliance or incident frequency, but as an issue with lasting social and relational consequences for Nashville communities.

### 1.6.1 Financial Costs of Misconduct

In addition to social and relational impacts, police misconduct and excessive use of force carry measurable financial consequences for Nashville residents and local government. Settlements related to police violence are typically paid through the city's Judgments and Losses Fund, resulting in substantial taxpayer-funded expenditures. For example, following the death of Daniel Hambrick, his family received a $2.25 million settlement (Max, 2021), and other individuals have received significant payouts related to claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, or excessive force.

In Fiscal Year 2022, the city expended more than $8.5 million from the Judgments and Losses Fund for settlements, though this figure includes claims beyond those involving MNPD (Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 2023, p. 479). Comparisons with other Tennessee cities, such as Memphis, where more than $8.7 million was paid over a seven-year period (Thomson-DeVeaux et al., 2021), demonstrate that the financial impact of police misconduct is not unique to Nashville. These expenditures represent not only direct fiscal costs, but also opportunity costs, diverting public resources that could otherwise support community services, violence prevention, or public safety initiatives. As such, financial liability serves as an additional dimension through which police use of force affects communities and municipal governance.

### 1.6.2 Implications for Nashville

As the above findings illustrate, police use of force in Nashville is a broad issue shaped by policy decisions, reporting practices, and community context. Beyond the data, use of force carries implications for public trust, community well-being, and municipal resources. Patterns identified in the previous report suggest that use of force is experienced unevenly across communities and may contribute to ongoing concerns about fairness and legitimacy. At the same time, financial costs associated with misconduct and legal settlements reflect an additional layer of impact for the city. These combined dynamics reinforce the importance of sustained oversight, transparent reporting, and collaborative efforts to strengthen accountability and public safety in Nashville.

## 1.7 MNPD Use of Force Policy

MNPD's own policy establishes expectations for lawful, proportionate, and reasonable uses of force. The Department Manual outlines a force continuum, defines key terms such as deadly force, de-escalation, and passive resistance, and requires officers to use only the amount of force that is necessary to accomplish lawful objectives (Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, 2026). The department manual also prohibits chokeholds and mandates a duty to intervene when officers observe excessive or unlawful force by colleagues. Provisions emphasize de-escalation techniques, including communication, slowing the pace of encounters, and tactical repositioning, as preferable to physical force whenever feasible.

### 1.7.1 Canine Unit Policies

MNPD's Canine Unit includes more than twenty canine teams operating on a 24-hour basis (Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, 2025b). Its operations are governed by Department Manual 14.40, separate from Title 11, the Manual's use of force (now Response to Resistance) policy. However, the Canine Unit policy states twice that using a police canine constitutes the use of force or the implied threat of the use of force. Below is a summary of MNPD's Canine Unit policies most relevant to the topic of use of force.

Under 14.40.020(A), the handler of a canine makes the initial decision to deploy a canine for physical apprehension, unless relieved by a Canine Section supervisor on scene. Any supervisor who orders deployment of a canine over the handler's objection shall assume full responsibility for the outcome. Listed under 14.40.030, four subsections outline situations where deployment of an aggressive canine is authorized:

- With probable cause on an enumerated list of offenses, most of them violent. (Note: the list also includes burglary of a structure, so deployment of a canine on a non-violent property crime suspect is also authorized per this policy.)
- At a tactical incident on a canine or SWAT supervisor's approval, with no specified criminal offense requirement.
- Any felony suspect evading arrest who is reasonably believed to be armed or is concealed where officer entry would pose a serious risk.
- Misdemeanor suspects only where a firearm was used or displayed, the suspect is concealed, and release would pose a serious risk to the public or police.

Before releasing a canine in a building search, the handler must deliver a verbal scripted warning and wait at least sixty seconds, unless articulable demands of the situation justify releasing without warning or waiting a shorter or longer period. It is worth noting that the verbal warning interval appears only in the building search subsection. Felony tracking and open area search provisions do not have a similar requirement attached to them. In open area searches, the canine works off-lead, which is permitted only where the handler and all involved personnel are reasonably certain that no innocent bystanders are present.

The policy establishes separate review requirements following canine apprehensions. Every physical apprehension by a canine is reviewed and evaluated by a canine supervisor, who reports the evaluation to the Section Commander and maintains a record of the review. When a canine bite or other injury caused by a Canine Unit dog occurs, a Precinct Investigative Unit investigates and forwards its findings to the Chief and Deputy Chief of Police. It is worth noting that section 14.40 of the Manual does not itself link either review process to a requirement that an entry be made in the Department's RTR Module (see Section 1.8.1). Responsibility for arranging appropriate medical treatment and booking is assigned to the officer who received the initial call.

Several provisions that would ordinarily place limits on use of a force option of this severity are absent. Section 14.40 requires no call-off once a subject is compliant or controlled and sets no limit on the duration of a bite. Although Section 14.40 directs personnel to consider the degree of force justified before using a canine, it does not expressly identify subject-specific factors such as age or apparent age, size, apparent disability, or apparent mental health crisis as considerations in determining whether canine deployment is appropriate. The current policy draws no distinction in authorization between an apprehension involving contact and one that does not. Although Section 14.40 requires reports and supervisory evaluations associated with canine apprehensions and investigations of canine bites, it does not expressly require centralized aggregation or periodic analysis of canine deployments, bites, or related outcomes. Section 14.40 also does not itself require that a canine bite be referred to the Critical Incident Review Board.

## 1.8 Response to Resistance – MNPD Recent Use of Force Policy Changes (2026)

On July 4th, 2026, MNPD published a revised version of Title 11 of its Department Manual (Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, 2026). This included a change to the policy title: Title 11 and section 11.10 are now "Response to Resistance" rather than "Use of Force." However, several internal headings still read as "Definitions Specific to Use of Force," "Use of Force Training," and "Reporting Use of Force, Firearms Display, and Injuries in Custody". The phrase

"use of force" also remains throughout the body of the policy. The remaining changes are discussed in Sections 1.8.1-4 below.

### 1.8.1 Reporting: New Response to Resistance Module

Beyond the name change, there were also significant changes in how use of force incidents are reported. Now, use of force reporting shall be documented via an electronic Response to Resistance Module (RTR Module), instead of the four paper forms used previously: Form 108 (use of force), Form 108T (Taser use), Form 108F (firearm display), and Form 108NC (non-compliant suspect/arrestee). Additionally, supervisors complete the RTR Module entries based on their investigation of the incident, while involved officers fill out a Form 104 as a supplemental report for any use of force incident. Although Form 108 is no longer the primary reporting mechanism, the revised policy retains the form as a fallback when the electronic RTR Module cannot be completed. The policy also indicates that Form 108 may be used as a guide for the information officers should include in their supplemental reports. The RTR module entry and any associated documents are reviewed by the chain of command and forwarded to the Office of the Chief of Police, which maintains all RTR Module and related reports.

Provisions specifying when an RTR Module entry is required were changed as well. For instance, an RTR Module entry is no longer required for unintentional firearm discharges not associated with the use of force. And injury-related reporting requirements were also revised. Under the previous policy, reporting was required when an employee "takes an action" resulting in injury or death; the revised policy instead requires reporting when an employee "applies force" resulting in injury or death. Firearm displays are recorded as an "RTR – Display Only" entry.

### 1.8.2 Medical-Behavioral Emergency (MBE)

"Excited Delirium" has been removed from the policy. In its place, Medical-Behavioral Emergency (MBE) has been added. The revised policy defines MBE as a high-risk critical incident involving a medical condition that may manifest as a behavioral issue. The definition identifies several possible characteristics including irrational or disruptive behavior, delusional or panic behavior, heavy or rapid breathing, obesity, and actual knowledge of drug use. The policy also states that emergency medical care should be obtained without unnecessary delay. A new de-escalation technique, "recognizing emergencies," directs officers to remain vigilant for the signs and symptoms of medical and mental health emergencies such as MBEs and hypoglycemia and, where feasible, to coordinate engagement with EMS or CIT. The Taser section now includes a warning that multiple Taser applications may increase the risk of sudden death in people experiencing an MBE.

Lastly, the first aid section was rewritten to require officers to summon emergency medical personnel to the scene prior to physical engagement with a person exhibiting symptoms of an MBE where possible; where that is not possible, provide immediate aid after any use of force; monitor the individual for signs of physical distress, including breathing, consciousness, and vomiting, until the person is turned over to Nashville Fire Department (NFD) personnel; and communicate any observed signs or symptoms to the NFD personnel attending to the individual.

### 1.8.3 Equipment and Expectorant Barriers

A new section governing the use of "Expectorant Barriers" has been added to the policy. The policy limits the use of expectorant barriers to handcuffed persons in lawful custody who have spat at an officer, attempted or threatened to spit at an officer, or when there is a reasonable belief that the person will do so. Application must be consistent with training, must not restrict the subject's airway, and may not be used as punishment or retaliation.

An expectorant barrier may not be applied when the subject is prone, exhibiting characteristics of an MBE, showing signs of lethargy or sleepiness, vomiting, experiencing a medical emergency, or showing signs of respiratory distress. The policy also prohibits use on a subject who has been exposed to chemical spray unless there is an articulable necessity. Separately, expectorant barriers should not be used on persons at the extremes of age or on persons with physical disabilities absent clearly articulable and compelling reasons. Officers are required to continue monitoring any

person wearing an expectorant barrier and may not leave the individual unattended. The barrier must be removed immediately if the person's health appears adversely affected, vomiting begins, or the person loses consciousness.

The revised policy also includes changes related to equipment use, training, and documentation. Officers are now required to carry their duty sidearm with the inserted magazine filled to capacity and a round chambered, while all other magazines carried for duty must also be filled to capacity. Similarly, Tasers are to be maintained in an immediately deployable state with live cartridges. Pepper balls have been added to the list of less-lethal devices. The revised policy also adds documentation requirements related to training and proficiency. The Training Division must document officer training and proficiency involving chemical spray, Tasers, and less-lethal devices. The Training Division must also document receipt of the policy and delivery of the use of force curriculum.

### 1.8.4 Critical Incident Review Board (CIRB)

Under the revised policy, the Force Review Board (FRB) has been replaced by the Critical Incident Review Board (CIRB). The CIRB is defined as a board convened at the direction of the Chief of Police to review whether departmental policies and procedures governing a critical incident were followed. The CIRB serves a similar function to the prior FRB, although its composition, scope, and specified outcomes differ.

The composition of the board has also changed. The CIRB no longer includes the Commander of the Criminal Investigation Division or a representative of the OPA. In addition, an attorney from the Metropolitan Department of Law may elect to attend as a non-voting member, whereas the previous policy provided that an attorney would be present.

The revised policy also changes the specified outcomes of CIRB review. The CIRB continues to issue an "In Policy or Out of Policy" determination and may provide "Associated Recommendations," but it no longer makes a separate determination as to whether an incident was "Intentional, Negligent, or Accidental." The revised policy also removes the provision allowing the OPA representative to submit an independent opinion regarding the board's conclusions to the Chief of Police within fifteen working days.

The revised policy identifies the CIRB as an internal audit function of MNPD and specifies that CIRB proceedings are not open to the public. In addition, Title 11 no longer contains the prior explicit provision requiring the chairperson to retain records, notes, and reports associated with each hearing or requiring board members to return reports at the conclusion of the review. The provision authorizing an annual Departmental Force Review Board was also removed. Under the previous policy, the Chief of Police could convene the board annually to review all uses of deadly force and all cases reviewed by the Force Review Board for the purpose of identifying patterns or systemic issues. The revised policy does not establish a directly equivalent annual board-level review of all deadly-force incidents and all cases reviewed by the CIRB.

Two annual reporting requirements remain, however. The revised Title 11 identifies the Critical Incident Review Team (CIRT) as responsible for investigating critical incidents and presenting its findings to the CIRB. The CIRT supervisor must provide an annual analysis of critical incident activities, policies, and practices, including dates and times of incidents, encounter types, trends or patterns related to race, age, and gender, injury trends, and the impact of findings on policy, practice, equipment, and training. The Quality Assurance Manager must also continue to provide an annual use of force analysis, which must now include a summary or trend analysis of incidents reviewed by the CIRB.

Finally, the scope of incidents subject to CIRB review has been broadened in several respects. First, firearm discharges involving aggressive animals are now investigated by CIRT rather than the Precinct Investigative Unit, with CIRT making a recommendation as to whether the CIRB should review the incident. Second, the Chief of Police may now convene the CIRB to review any incident rather than only a departmental use of force incident. Third, all critical incidents referred to and investigated by CIRT are subject to mandatory review. Fourth, an Assistant Chief has been added to the list of officials who may refer an incident to the CIRB. Overall, these revisions broaden the categories of incidents potentially subject to CIRB review while also changing the board's membership, specified determinations, public accessibility, and role within MNPD's annual review structure.

# 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

## 2.1 Measurement Gaps

Over the past decade, research and official inquiries have reached two consistent findings: police use of force is rare when compared to the total number of police–public encounters, but when it occurs, the harms are unevenly distributed and not well measured (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2018; DeVylder et al., 2022). The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (2018) emphasized that national data on use of force remain incomplete, leaving scholars and journalists to rely on independent databases maintained by organizations such as The Guardian, The Washington Post, and Mapping Police Violence. Despite these limitations, findings across multiple sources consistently reveal racial disparities in both lethal and nonlethal force, as well as in accountability after fatal incidents.

In response to these persistent gaps in measurement and accountability, researchers and policy organizations have developed tools designed to standardize data collection and improve transparency. One such effort to address these gaps is the Justice Navigator, a data-driven assessment tool developed by the Center for Policing Equity (CPE) to help police departments and communities identify, measure, and reduce racial disparities in policing. Drawing on departmental data and contextual indicators, Justice Navigator evaluates where disparities occur, how large they are, and the extent to which they are associated with police practices and policies rather than broader environmental factors. Building on this framework, Justice Navigator offers a practical path to improve measurement and accountability. It calls for recording every stop and every use of force, including officer perception of race, age, and gender, the exact location, the reason for contact, all types of force used, the nature of resistance, and whether de-escalation was attempted. It also urges routine audits and supervisor review to protect data quality. These steps make it possible to separate the effects of policy and officer decisions from broader community factors like poverty or crime rates (Justice Navigator, 2025).

## 2.2 Disparities in Force

Although measurement limitations complicate precise estimates, the available evidence consistently points to clear and persistent racial disparities in the use of force. National data show that use of force incidents fall disproportionately on communities of color. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (2018) reported higher per-capita fatal shooting rates for Black, Latino, and Native American people compared to White people. In 2016, the fatality rates per million residents were approximately 6.66 for Black people, 3.23 for Latinos, 10.13 for Native Americans, and 2.9 for Whites. Disparities are even sharper for unarmed victims: in early 2015, 32% of Black people killed by police were unarmed compared to 15% of White victims. Although Black men make up only about 6% of the U.S. population, they represented nearly 40% of unarmed people fatally shot by police that year. Accountability was also rare, with Mapping Police Violence reporting that officers were not charged in roughly 99% of fatal incidents (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2018).

Additionally, these disparities persist even after accounting for crime rates and exposure to enforcement. For example, the Goff et al. (2016) found that Black civilians are subjected to higher rates and greater severity of force across multiple categories even when controlling for arrests and crime (Goff et al., 2016). Overall, research indicates that force is used in a small percentage of police–civilian interactions, yet disparities remain pronounced, with Black individuals experiencing force at rates several times higher than White individuals (Center for Policing Equity, 2020; Goff et al., 2016; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2018).

Geography and socioeconomic context further shape these disparities. Police shootings are concentrated in areas with higher poverty rates and larger Black populations (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2018). At the same time, disparities are intersectional. Using nationally representative data from the Police–Public Contact Survey, Motley and Joe (2018) found that being male and low-income increased risk of exposure to force within racial groups. For Black residents, men earning less than $20,000 annually were especially vulnerable; for White residents, men, low-income adults, and those

aged 35 and older were at greater risk. These findings underscore how race, income, and gender combine to create compounding vulnerabilities, particularly for low-income Black men.

In addition to race, income, and gender, disparities in police encounters also extend across sexual orientation and gender identity. Research shows that LGBTQ+ people face heightened risks of profiling, harassment, and violence in their interactions with police. National surveys document elevated rates of stops, searches, and use of force incidents among LGBTQ+ residents, with transgender women and LGBTQ+ people of color facing the greatest risks (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2018). Reports describe practices such as "walking while trans" profiling, excessive force, and a lack of accountability for misconduct.

These experiences may deepen mistrust of law enforcement and may contribute to underreporting of crimes within LGBTQ+ communities. For many residents, the expectation of mistreatment outweighs the potential benefits of seeking police assistance. This cycle of mistrust undermines both public safety and community well-being, while also revealing gaps in training and accountability structures that fail to protect LGBTQ+ residents equitably. Addressing these disparities directly would require intentional efforts in cultural humility training, anti-bias education, and in implementing more transparent accountability mechanisms.

## 2.3 Officer Characteristics and Use of Force

While these patterns highlight who is most impacted by police use of force, understanding disparities also requires examining the characteristics of the officers involved in these encounters. Research shows that officer identity relates to how often force is used and in what situations (Ba et al., 2021). In Chicago, Black and Hispanic officers made fewer stops and arrests and used force less often than White officers working the same beat at the same time, with the largest differences in encounters with Black civilians and in discretionary enforcement of lower-level offenses (Ba et al., 2021). Female officers also used force less often than male officers across racial groups in the same study, a pattern echoed in a national summary of the findings (Temming, 2021). These results suggest that departments with greater racial and gender diversity may reduce unnecessary contacts and lower the likelihood of escalation in everyday encounters (Ba et al., 2021; Temming, 2021). They also align with reporting that links diversification to better police–community interactions and greater legitimacy in the eyes of residents (Huber, 2021).

Why these differences appear is still being studied, but several explanations are plausible. Officers who share background or language with residents may rely more on communication and less on discretionary stops that can escalate, especially in areas with long-standing distrust (Ba et al., 2021). The National Institute of Justice notes that context, training, and supervisory guidance shape how officers judge when to use force, which means policy design and oversight can either widen or narrow these gaps (National Institute of Justice, 2020). State and local syntheses also report that clearer rules, stronger supervision, and targeted training support fewer force incidents while maintaining public safety (Premkumar et al., 2021).

The evidence consistently indicates that officer composition, training, and deployment measurable factors that shape how force is used in everyday encounters. For Nashville, this suggests that intentional investments in recruitment, supervision, and evidence-based training are critical not only for reducing unnecessary uses of force, but also for strengthening community trust and improving the consistency of police–community interactions.

## 2.4 Structural Explanations for Disparities in Use of Force

However, focusing solely on officer characteristics risks overlooking the broader structural conditions that produce and sustain disparities in the use of force. A central debate in the literature is whether disparities in use of force reflect policing strategies concentrated in high-crime areas, such as hotspot policing or stop-and-frisk practices, or deeper structural biases embedded within the system. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (2018) documents both this argument and substantial counterevidence. First, bias can enter at multiple decision points, including stops, charges, bail, and sentencing. Second, arrest data, often used as a proxy for criminal activity, are themselves shaped by

enforcement patterns. Third, existing research finds no consistent relationship between a city's violent crime rate and its rate of fatal police shootings. In addition, a natural experiment during a slowdown in proactive policing by the New York City Police Department found that when low-level enforcement declined, complaints of major crimes also decreased by approximately 3–6% (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2018), complicating common deterrence-based explanations.

Because enforcement patterns can shape the very data used to explain them, Justice Navigator recommends three complementary approaches. First, improving reporting practices strengthens what is measured, documented, and made publicly available. Second, regulatory strategies establish clearer expectations for officer behavior and accountability. Third, system redesign shifts certain responsibilities to non-police responders when a police response is not the most appropriate, such as in some mental health crises or routine traffic-related incidents. These approaches aim to reduce disparities and minimize harm while maintaining public safety (Justice Navigator, 2025).

## 2.5 Community Perceptions and Mistrust

Beyond patterns of use of force itself, disparities also shape how communities perceive and interact with law enforcement. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (2018) compiles extensive perception research: majorities of Black adults report personal experiences of discrimination with police and expect greater use of unnecessary force against Black people; many avoid calling police due to anticipated mistreatment. Large, multi-city analyses show Black and Latino residents are disproportionately stopped and searched, often for nonviolent offenses, with limited contraband yield. Qualitative testimony describes an "us-versus-them" occupational culture transmitted during training and through peer socialization, reinforcing disparate treatment.

## 2.6 Disability and Mental Health

In addition to racial and community-level disparities, people with disabilities, particularly those experiencing mental health crises, face distinct and elevated risks in police encounters. In 2016 and 2017 alone, *The Washington Post* recorded roughly 240 deaths per year among individuals with known mental illnesses. In 2015, a person in mental crisis was fatally shot about once every 36 hours (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2018). Many of these encounters began not as criminal events but as calls for help regarding erratic or unsafe behavior.

Investigations such as the U.S. Department of Justice's report on the Chicago Police Department have highlighted training and policy gaps in how officers respond to disability-related incidents (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017). Too often, these situations escalate because officers are not adequately equipped with crisis intervention skills. Advocates stress the importance of compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, expanded crisis intervention training, and the adoption of de-escalation tactics tailored to people with mental health needs. These recommendations reflect a growing consensus that disability is a central but under-addressed dimension of use of force outcomes.

## 2.7 Public Understanding

In addition to disparities in lived experiences, public understanding of police use of force also shapes perceptions of legitimacy and accountability. Public knowledge about police use of force is often limited or inaccurate. Khanizadeh, Bennell, and McGale (2025) found that university students greatly overestimated how often police use lethal and nonlethal force, as well as officers' accuracy with firearms and the number of training hours they receive. After completing a six-hour online module, knowledge improved regardless of participants' initial views of police or their demographic characteristics, and perceptions of police legitimacy rose modestly. The sample was small (160 students at one Canadian university) and had no control group, but the results suggest that structured education can improve public understanding of use of force.

These findings are consistent with U.S. survey research showing that the public overestimates both the number of unarmed people killed by police and the share of people killed by police who are Black (Goldberg, 2023; McCaffree &

Saide, 2021). Media portrayals shape public perceptions of police use of force (Donovan & Klahm, 2015), and highly publicized incidents can shift public opinion of police departments (Weitzer, 2002). Khanizadeh et al. (2025) suggest that evidence-based education could benefit jurors, journalists, and community members alike, though this has not yet been tested directly. Educational efforts may not eliminate concerns about disparities, but they can promote more informed conversations about use of force practices.

## 2.8 Evidence-Based Strategies for Reducing Use of Force

Among the most widely adopted strategies aimed at reducing harmful police–civilian encounters are body-worn cameras (BWCs) and de-escalation training. Both approaches have received significant policy attention and investment, but their effectiveness depends heavily on how they are implemented within broader organizational systems.

Body-worn cameras have been widely adopted across the United States, supported by federal funding and strong public demand for transparency and accountability. Research by Wright, Gaozhao, and Houston (2024) shows that public perceptions of use of force incidents are influenced by both officer identity and camera presence. In their study, actions by White and male officers were more likely to be viewed as requiring investigation, while the presence of a BWC often led participants to believe that no further inquiry was needed. These findings suggest that cameras can strengthen perceptions of legitimacy but may also lead to overreliance on video evidence as a substitute for independent review.

The broader evidence on BWCs remains mixed. Randomized controlled trials frequently show reductions in complaints, with mixed effects on use of force; some evidence suggests results depend on clear, mandatory activation policies. However, non-randomized studies produce more varied results, highlighting the importance of policy design, supervision, and consistent enforcement. Overall, BWCs can improve transparency and community trust, but their effectiveness depends on clear rules, consistent activation, and limits on officer discretion. (Ariel et al., 2016; Lum et al., 2020)

De-escalation training has also emerged as a key strategy for reducing use of force, with growing empirical support. Engel, Corsaro, Isaza, and McManus (2022) conducted a stepped-wedge randomized controlled trial of the Police Executive Research Forum's Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics (ICAT) training in Louisville. Their study found statistically significant reductions of approximately 28 percent in use of force incidents, 26 percent in citizen injuries, and 36 percent in officer injuries following implementation. These effects persisted even after accounting for arrest trends and time-based confounders, indicating that the reductions were not simply due to decreased exposure.

At the same time, the evidence suggests that training alone is not sufficient. Earlier studies of de-escalation programs often showed improvements in officer attitudes without consistent behavioral change (Engel et al., 2020). The Louisville findings indicate that meaningful reductions occur when training is embedded within broader systems that include supportive policies, supervisory oversight, managerial reinforcement, and community engagement. Together, these findings underscore that both BWCs and de-escalation training are most effective when implemented as part of a comprehensive strategy rather than as standalone interventions.

## 2.9 Legal Context

These policy and practice considerations operate within a broader legal and institutional framework that shapes how police use of force is monitored, evaluated, and addressed. Walter (2025) reviews the key constitutional cases that govern use of force, including *Terry v. Ohio*, *Tennessee v. Garner*, and *Graham v. Connor*. He also examines institutional factors such as qualified immunity, internal investigations, and the "blue wall of silence," which can limit accountability. While public scrutiny of policing has grown since 2020, indictments and convictions of officers remain relatively rare, with high-profile cases such as those of Derek Chauvin and Kimberly Potter standing out as exceptions.

Walter further documents the rise of public databases designed to fill gaps in federal reporting, including The Counted and Mapping Police Violence. These tools have expanded transparency and allowed for greater public and scholarly oversight, but they also reflect the federal government's continued failure to establish a complete national dataset.

Together, these legal precedents, institutional practices, and data initiatives show the complex interplay of law, policy, and accountability in shaping how force is both regulated and perceived.

### 2.10 Consensus, Contention, and Gaps

Across studies on use of force, there is general agreement that the use of force is rare in the overall number of police–public encounters, but it is not evenly distributed. Racial and ethnic disparities remain clear, as Black, Latino, and Native American people experience higher rates and greater severity of force than White people, even when accounting for arrest and crime levels. These disparities also intersect with socioeconomic status and gender, with low-income men, particularly Black men, facing the highest risks. Disability and LGBTQ+ identity further contribute to vulnerability, but these factors are often overlooked in policy and training.

Another area of consensus around use of force research is the need for more complete and reliable data. Federal reporting remains inconsistent, which has forced researchers, journalists, and advocacy groups to fill gaps through third-party databases. These independent sources reveal important patterns, but they also demonstrate the limits of accountability when official data are incomplete. Transparency and robust data collection are seen as critical for building trust between law enforcement and the public.

At the same time, important questions remain contested. Scholars debate the extent to which disparities are the result of proactive policing strategies in high-crime areas or deeper structural biases within the system. Body-worn cameras have been shown to improve perceptions of legitimacy, but the evidence on whether they reduce actual use of force incidents is mixed. Similarly, while recent randomized studies show promise for de-escalation training, questions remain about how durable these effects are across different agencies, unions, and policy environments.

There are also gaps in understanding how best to scale public education about use of force. Misperceptions about the frequency and circumstances of force remain widespread, often shaped by media coverage that focuses on extreme cases. Educational interventions have shown potential to correct these misunderstandings and enhance perceptions of police legitimacy, but their long-term impact is not well studied. Future research will need to clarify how these interventions can balance correcting misconceptions while also addressing the real harms and disparities faced by marginalized communities.

## 3. IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIOR NCRB RECOMMENDATIONS (2024)

While national research provides critical insight into patterns of police use of force, local accountability depends on how departments translate this evidence into policy, practice, and measurable change. Each report provides an opportunity to assess not only emerging trends but also the extent to which prior recommendations have been implemented. Tracking implementation over time ensures that findings lead to sustained institutional change rather than remaining descriptive.

In 2024, the NCRB issued twelve recommendations to MNPD aimed at strengthening reporting practices, improving accountability mechanisms, promoting equitable policing, and increasing transparency. As of this review, MNPD has not issued a formal written response outlining actions taken in response to these recommendations. Accordingly, this assessment is based on a review of MNPD Department Manual Title 11.10, Response to Resistance, as revised on July 4, 2026, together with MNPD's publicly available data systems.

The 2024 recommendations were written in the context of the prior version of Title 11.10, then titled "Use of Force." Where the July 2026 revision changed a provision relevant to a recommendation, the discussion below notes the change. Overall, findings suggest partial progress, with implementation varying by thematic area. While some procedural elements reflect alignment with prior recommendations, many of the structural and evaluative components necessary for sustained accountability remain incomplete or unaddressed.

## 3.1 Data Transparency & Oversight Access (Recommendations 1, 2b, 11)

IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: PARTIAL

MNPD has taken steps toward increasing transparency through the continued operation of its public Use of Force Dashboard, and Metro Council's 2024 ordinance (BL2024-179) now requires quarterly use of force reports to the Council. These mechanisms provide a level of public visibility into departmental activity that did not previously exist.

Important limitations remain. The NCRB no longer receives direct access to the raw datasets that were previously available, which limits the Board's ability to conduct statistical analysis of disparities in force or case-level audits of proportionality. The revised Title 11.10 does not change this. It requires the Quality Assurance Manager to prepare an annual use of force analysis (11.10.210(G)(11)), but that analysis is delivered to the Chief of Police and is not required to be published or shared with the NCRB. While transparency has improved at the community level, the current structure constrains independent oversight and limits the depth of analysis required to fully assess patterns, disparities, and accountability outcomes.

## 3.2 Policy & Reporting Reform (Recommendations 2a, 4a–b, 9)

IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: PARTIAL

The July 2026 revision made the largest changes in this area. Title 11.10 replaced the four paper forms previously used to document force (Form 108, 108T, 108F, and 108NC) with a single electronic Response to Resistance (RTR) Module. Supervisors complete the RTR Module entry based on their investigation of the incident, and involved officers complete a Form 104 supplemental report (11.10.200(B)). Consolidating reporting into one system addresses part of the 2024 concern about inconsistent documentation from one form to another, and the elimination of Form 108NC removes the separate non-compliance form the 2024 report identified.

Gaps remain in how reportable force is defined and recorded. The policy defines broad resistance categories (11.10.020) but not each of the specific categories that appear in MNPD's public data, and this review could not determine from the policy text whether the RTR Module standardizes resistance fields. Several reporting triggers also depend on a judgment made after the encounter. Whether soft empty-hand control used in response to active resistance generates an RTR Module entry is left to the supervisor (11.10.200(D)(4)), and firearm and Taser displays are reportable only when the display reduced or eliminated the need for further force (11.10.200(D)(3); 11.10.120(C)). As a result, the policy still does not ensure that all reportable uses of force, including firearm and Taser displays, are consistently captured in departmental data.

The revision also changed what triggers a report. Reporting is now required when an employee "applies force" resulting in injury or death, rather than when an employee "takes an action" with that result, and unintentional firearm discharges not associated with a use of force no longer require an RTR Module entry. These changes may affect the comparability of data reported after July 2026 with the 2024–2025 data analyzed in this report.

## 3.3 Early Intervention & Peer Accountability (Recommendations 3, 4b)

IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: LIMITED

MNPD maintains review structures for individual incidents. Under the revised policy, the Critical Incident Review Board (CIRB) replaced the Force Review Board and reviews whether policy was followed in critical incidents referred to it. The CIRB is defined as an internal audit function, and its proceedings are not open to the public (11.10.210(F)(4)). The Quality Assurance Manager's annual use of force analysis must now include a summary or trend analysis of incidents reviewed by the CIRB (11.10.210(G)(11)), and the Critical Incident Review Team supervisor must provide a separate

annual analysis of critical incidents (11.10.210(G)(12)). The revision also removed the provision allowing the Chief to convene an annual Departmental Force Review Board to review all uses of deadly force for patterns or systemic issues.

None of these mechanisms is a force-specific early intervention component. MNPD operates an Early Intervention System under Title 2.30 (see Recommendation 7), but Title 11.10 does not reference it, and the EIS does not compare an officer's force with the resistance recorded or set a force-specific review threshold.

## 3.4 Training, Culture & Procedural Justice (Recommendations 5, 7a–b, 8, 10)

IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: PARTIAL

The revised policy requires de-escalation where feasible (11.10.030(N)) and annual instruction on the use of force policy, with receipt and curriculum delivery documented by the Training Division (11.10.190(A)). The July 2026 revision added a de-escalation technique, "recognizing emergencies," which directs officers to watch for signs of medical and mental health emergencies and, where feasible, coordinate with EMS or Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) officers. These additions reflect alignment with national practice.

The policy does not incorporate the elements recommended in 2024: cultural humility training, neighborhood-specific bias awareness, and formal procedural justice instruction. CIT officers appear only as a resource an officer may request during de-escalation (11.10.030(N)(3)(b) and (d)), and the training section sets no crisis intervention training requirement. There is no indication that de-escalation is delivered as structured, recurring training or evaluated through performance assessment, and the policy does not establish community-engaged training models or peer accountability mechanisms. Implementation reflects general alignment in language but lacks the depth and institutional reinforcement necessary for sustained change.

## 3.5 Recruitment & Representation (Recommendation 12)

IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: UNDETERMINED

The 2024 recommendations emphasized building a diverse and representative workforce as a strategy for reducing disparities in use of force outcomes. MNPD leadership has publicly expressed a commitment to diversity through recruitment efforts and community engagement. However, Title 11.10 does not address recruitment, hiring practices, or workforce composition, before or after the July 2026 revision. As such, implementation cannot be assessed through policy review alone. Section 5.7.2 provides current workforce composition data for context.

## 3.6 Youth & School Contexts (Recommendations 5, 6)

IMPLEMENTATION STATUS: LARGELY UNADDRESSED

The 2024 report highlighted the need for developmentally appropriate use of force policies and greater transparency regarding police interactions involving youth, particularly in school settings. The revised Title 11.10 contains no standalone provision requiring officers to consider age, developmental stage, or disability in use of force decisions. However, the General Provisions section (11.10.030(A)(2)(I)) lists "Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength…" as factors to consider in determining 'reasonableness' of force. Two more subsections of the policy touch on these factors for specific tools: expectorant barriers should not be used on persons at the extremes of age or with physical disabilities absent compelling reasons (11.10.050), and Taser use is discouraged on persons who are "visibly pregnant, … extremes of age or physically disabled" (11.10.100(C)(5)).

The policy makes no reference to school-based policing or to reporting requirements for incidents occurring in Metro Nashville Public Schools, and it does not require sharing school-based use of force data with the NCRB. As a result, there is no clear evidence of implementation in this area, despite the youth-related disparities identified in prior analyses.

### 3.7 Overall Assessment of Implementation

Collectively, this analysis indicates that MNPD has made incremental progress toward the NCRB's 2024 recommendations, but that progress remains uneven and largely procedural. The July 2026 revision consolidated force reporting into a single electronic system, added medical-emergency guidance, and restructured incident review under the CIRB. It did not add a force-specific early intervention component, youth-specific force guidance, crisis intervention training requirements, or a mechanism for sharing data with the NCRB. Key structural components related to data integrity, early intervention, youth protections, and training depth remain incomplete, and many of the gaps identified in prior reporting persist. Addressing them will require sustained collaboration between MNPD and the NCRB, improved access to data for independent oversight, and policy implementation that moves from alignment in principle to measurable outcomes in practice.

## 4. POLICY COMPARISON – ASSESSING MNPD POLICY ACCORDING TO NACOLE PRINCIPLES

### 4.1 Alignment between NACOLE 23 Principles for an Effective Use of Force Policy and MNPD Policy

The National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) board established its Policy Development Committee in 2020 to give oversight practitioners guidance on policy. The committee's 23 principles describe what an effective use of force policy should contain. The NCRB evaluated MNPD's updated Title 11.10 Response to Resistance policy against NACOLE's Twenty-Three Principles for an Effective Use of Force Policy (NACOLE, 2025b), and found that MNPD's policy at least partially aligns with 19 of the 23 principles. The policy gaps or deficiencies associated with the remaining four principles are outlined in the sections that follow.

We classified a principle as 'partially addressed' when Title 11.10 addresses the principle but omits one or more elements NACOLE identifies. In a few cases, MNPD's provisions differ from NACOLE's guidance, such as the scope of Taser authorization. Finally, we identified several areas where MNPD's policy is more restrictive than NACOLE's recommendations. Summaries of the 23 principles below are condensed from the source document; consult the full text for exact policy language.

**Table A. NACOLE Twenty-Three Principles for an Effective Use of Force Policy**

| No. | NACOLE principle | Description | Rating |
|---|---|---|---|
| **I** | Clearly delineated use of force standard | Treats Graham v. Connor's objective reasonableness test as a minimum floor, not a ceiling. Proposes a standard requiring force to be objectively reasonable, objectively necessary, and proportional, with alternatives to physical force used whenever possible. | Partial |
| **II** | Sanctity of life | Policies must state that safeguarding human life, dignity, and liberty is the agency's highest priority. Officers are expected to rely on rapport-building communication, crisis intervention, and de-escalation before resorting to force. | Partial |
| **III** | Defined force categories | Policies must define force, deadly force, and less-than-lethal force. Deadly force covers any force that, by its manner of use or intended use, creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. | Partial |
| **IV** | Proportionality and reasonableness | Policies must list factors (threat severity, the subject's mental state and ability to comply, available alternatives, and more) for judging whether force was reasonable, necessary, and proportional. Permissible force is tied to a resistance continuum running from compliant to aggravated resistance. | Partial |

| No. | NACOLE principle | Description | Rating |
|---|---|---|---|
| **V** | Force levels, reporting, and supervision | Sorts force into four levels, from soft-hand control to deadly force, and requires supervisor notification and a written report before the end of shift for every use. Level 3 and 4 incidents require a supervisor at the scene, and failing to activate a body-worn camera before a force encounter counts as a policy violation. | Partial |
| **VI** | De-escalation | Makes resolving encounters without force the officer's priority throughout every encounter. Lists tactics such as slowing the pace, creating distance, waiting subjects out, and calling crisis resources, with added care for vulnerable populations. | Partial |
| **VII** | Crisis intervention training | Requires crisis intervention training on top of de-escalation training: at least 8 hours for all officers, and a 40-hour POST-approved curriculum for training officers, designated CIT officers, and mental health response teams. | Not aligned |
| **VIII** | Medical aid after force | Officers must promptly request medical aid for any injury, complaint, or sign of distress after force, even if aid is declined, and render aid within their training. Aid is automatic for Level 2 force and above, canine bites, and any report of breathing difficulty, and prone subjects must be repositioned as soon as it's safe. | Partial |
| **IX** | Serious bodily injury and deadly force | Limits deadly force to imminent threats of death or serious bodily injury and lists examples such as hard strikes to the head or neck with an impact weapon. Defines "imminent" as present ability, opportunity, and intent, and states that an officer's subjective fear of future harm doesn't qualify. | Partial |
| **X** | Duty to intervene | Every officer, regardless of rank, must intervene to stop unreasonable force and report it to a supervisor. Failing to intervene carries the same discipline as using the force, and officers who intervene are protected from retaliation. | Partial |
| **XI** | Force to effect arrests | Permits objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional force to make an arrest, prevent escape, or overcome resistance. Officers need not retreat, though tactical repositioning and de-escalation are not considered retreat. | Partial |
| **XII** | Force to seize evidence | Allows proportional force to lawfully seize evidence or prevent its destruction. Prohibits any technique that restricts blood flow to the head or breathing while doing so. | Partial |
| **XIII** | Pain compliance techniques | Officers may use only pain compliance techniques they've been trained on by the department, and must weigh whether the subject is able to comply and has had a fair chance to do so. The technique must stop once compliance is achieved. | Not aligned |
| **XIV** | Restraint and control devices | Restricts control devices to trained officers and to subjects who are violent or show intent to be violent, with a verbal warning first when possible. Sets device-specific rules for batons, tear gas, OC spray, and tasers (limited to armed, violent subjects), plus inventory, inspection, and proficiency requirements. | Partial |
| **XV** | Use of deadly force | Permits deadly force only to stop an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, or to apprehend a fleeing violent felony suspect who poses that threat. Requires identification and warning when feasible, bans warning shots, and bars deadly force that would endanger bystanders except during an active shooter. | Partial |

| No. | NACOLE principle | Description | Rating |
|---|---|---|---|
| **XVI** | Chokeholds and airway restriction | Classifies any action that restricts breathing or blood flow (vascular or respiratory neck restraints, sustained pressure on the back or chest, blocking the nose or mouth) as deadly force and prohibits it. The prohibition applies even if the use is later found objectively reasonable. | Partial |
| **XVII** | Shooting at or from vehicles | Bars firing from a moving vehicle or at vehicle occupants unless an occupant poses an imminent danger of death or serious injury and no alternatives exist. A moving vehicle alone is not a threat, and officers must move out of a vehicle's path rather than shoot. | Partial |
| **XVIII** | Use of vehicles as force | Prohibits ramming or blocking with police vehicles in a way that amounts to lethal force. Permits the Vehicle Containment Technique only on stationary or slow-moving vehicles. | Not aligned |
| **XIX** | Unholstering and pointing a firearm | Limits drawing or pointing a firearm to maintenance, securing the weapon, training, or a reasonable belief that doing so will help control an encounter that could turn deadly. Every intentional unholstering or pointing requires a use of force report, published in the department's year-end report. | Partial |
| **XX** | Training on the policy | Requires periodic training so officers can articulate and demonstrate their knowledge of the policy. Use of force trainers must complete biannual refresher training on all aspects of the policy. | Partial |
| **XXI** | Use of force analysis | Departments must include an annual use of force analysis in their crime report to the community, with no officer names, subject names, or case numbers. It should cover subject demographics, force types by level, trends, and recommendations on training, equipment, and policy. | Partial |
| **XXII** | Civilian complaints | Departments must give the public a way to file complaints about specific force incidents or about use of force policy itself. Complaints go to Internal Affairs and/or the civilian oversight body through a transparent, accountable process. | Not aligned |
| **XXIII** | Policy review and updates | Agencies and the bodies that oversee them must meet annually to review and update the use of force policy to reflect developing practices. | Partial |

### PRINCIPLES LEAST ALIGNED WITH MNPD TITLE 11.10

Principle VII (Crisis intervention training): NACOLE calls for at least eight hours of crisis intervention training for all officers and a forty-hour curriculum for designated CIT officers. Title 11.10 refers to Crisis Intervention Team officers only as a resource an officer may request during de-escalation (11.10.030(N)(3)(b) and (d)). The training section (11.10.190) sets no crisis intervention training requirement, no minimum hours, and no standard for designating CIT officers.

Principle XIII (Pain compliance techniques): Title 11.10 does not define pain compliance, condition its use on training, list factors an officer must weigh before applying it, or require that a technique stop once the subject complies. Currently, the term appears in the policy only within the definition of soft empty-hand control (11.10.020(GG)) and in a reporting exclusion (11.10.200(D)).

Principle XVIII (Use of vehicles as force): Title 11.10 governs an officer's position relative to a suspect vehicle and firearm discharges at vehicles (11.10.030(I)(1)–(2)), but does not address ramming, blocking, or vehicle containment.

Section 11.10.030(O)(1)(b) acknowledges that a vehicle may be used as a defensive impact device without setting conditions on that use.

Principle XXII (Civilian complaints): Although civilian complaint mechanisms exist through the Office of Professional Accountability and the NCRB, the Title 11.10 policy itself does not direct the public to those processes or standardize complaint access language within the policy document. The Office of Professional Accountability appears only in its internal role of referring incidents to the CIRB and receiving out-of-policy findings (11.10.210(B)(5), (G)(2)).

### POLICY GAPS & AREAS OF MISALIGNMENT WITH NACOLE PRINCIPLES

NACOLE asks that force be objectively reasonable, objectively necessary, and proportional, and that agencies treat Graham v. Connor as a minimum standard. For MNPD, ‘reasonableness’ is the operative standard used. Title 11.10 refers to force that is "necessary and reasonable" in its purpose section (11.10.010) and then organizes its analysis of force around reasonableness (11.10.030(A)). Although the word “proportional” isn’t used in the policy, 11.10.010 states that “the degree of force should be in direct relationship to the amount of resistance exerted,” but goes on to state that the policy should not be construed as creating a higher legal standard of care. This language was factored into our assessment of several NACOLE principles, including I, IV, IX, XI, and XV.

Additionally, resistance categories are not assigned force level limits. MNPD's force continuum (11.10.020(M)) names six levels of subject behavior but does not state what force type each level permits (Principles IV and XIV).

MNPD’s provision that reporting of use of force incidents is dependent on supervisory judgment is out of alignment with a few of NACOLE’s recommended practices. According to Title 11.10, supervisors, rather than the officers who used force, complete RTR Module entries (11.10.200(B)(1), (F)). Furthermore, whether soft empty-hand control in response to active resistance generates an entry is left to the supervisor (11.10.200(D)(4)), and firearm and Taser displays are reportable only when the display reduced or eliminated the need for further force (11.10.200(D)(3); 11.10.120(C)). These provisions bear on Principles V and XIX, and they affect what MNPD's force data, including the data analyzed in Section 5, can show.

Finally, MNPD’s policy provides little external accountability or transparency. The annual use of force analysis (11.10.210(G)(11)) is delivered to the Chief of Police and is not required to be published. CIRB proceedings are not open to the public (11.10.210(F)(4)). The annual review at 11.10.190(D) is an internal Training Division review of directives and lesson plans. Principles XXI, XXII, and XXIII each depend on some form of external transparency or accountability, which is currently absent from Title 11.10.

### PROVISIONS THAT EXCEEDED NACOLE'S RECOMMENDATIONS

In the course of our review of Title 11.10, we found several provisions which are more restrictive than NACOLE's principles. The fleeing felon provision (11.10.150) requires, among other conditions, that all other means of apprehension be exhausted. Section 11.10.160 prohibits deadly force used solely to prevent a person from harming only themselves. Section 11.10.040(F) provides that flight alone does not justify force beyond official presence or verbal direction. Firearm discharges at moving vehicles require that the action be "absolutely necessary," defined as all other options having been exhausted, unavailable, or infeasible (11.10.020(A); 11.10.030(I)(2)). The policy also requires medical evaluation after force is used to search a person's mouth (11.10.030(P)) and requires use of force training annually rather than periodically (11.10.190(A)).

### RELATIONSHIP TO NCRB 2024 RECOMMENDATIONS

Many of these ratings correspond to concerns raised in the NCRB's 2024 recommendations (Section 3). The absence of a crisis intervention training requirement and the optional treatment of CIT resources relate to 2024 Recommendations 5, 7a–b, 8, and 10 on training and de-escalation. The absence of pain compliance guidance and of youth- and disability-specific force considerations relates to 2024 Recommendations 5 and 6. Conditional reporting of displays and soft empty-hand control relates to 2024 Recommendations 2a, 4a–b, and 9. An internal-only annual analysis, the absence of a complaint provision, and an annual policy review without external participation relate to 2024 Recommendations

1, 2b, and 11. The vehicle-as-force gap has no counterpart in the 2024 recommendations and is identified here for the first time. This practice of evaluation and comparison across a number of frameworks is useful as it contextualizes MNPD's written policy within the constantly evolving landscape of use of force standards and practices in police work.

## 4.2 Comparison with the Berkeley Police Department's Use of Force Policy

To complement the NACOLE review, the NCRB compared Title 11.10 with one department's written policy: the Berkeley Police Department's Use of Force policy (Policy 300 of its Law Enforcement Services Manual; Berkeley Police Department, 2024). Berkeley's policy was selected because NACOLE's use of force policy materials list Berkeley's minimal use of force standard among its examples of progressive local standards, rates it as setting the highest accountability threshold of the standards it compares, and includes Berkeley's policy among its core resources (*Syllabus: Use of Force*, 2025). The principles themselves repeat Policy 300's language nearly word for word in several places, including the statement that a department's highest priority is safeguarding the life, dignity, and liberty of all persons (NACOLE, 2025b, Principle II; Policy 300.1), the requirement that force be objectively reasonable, objectively necessary, and proportional (Principle I; 300.1.2), the nineteen factors for judging reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality (Principle IV; 300.3.1), pain compliance (Principle XIII; 300.3.5), the prohibition on using police vehicles to ram or block in a manner that appears to be lethal force (Principle XVIII; 300.5), and the annual joint review of the policy with the oversight agency (Principle XXIII; 300.13).

Where Section 4.1 identifies what Title 11.10 lacks, this comparison shows how a department has written those standards into policy.

The comparison covers the topics addressed by this report's recommendations (Table B). The syllabus refers to Berkeley's 2021 standard; this comparison uses the 2024 version of Policy 300. It compares written policy only. It does not assess how either department applies its policy in practice, and it does not compare use of force outcomes between the two cities.

**Table B. Comparison – Berkeley Police Department Policy vs. MNPD Title 11.10 Response to Resistance**

| Topic | Berkeley Policy 300 | MNPD Title 11.10 (July 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| **Standard of force** | 300.1.2: force must be objectively reasonable, objectively necessary, and proportional; states that Graham v. Connor and state law set only the minimum and that the policy is more restrictive. | 11.10.010: force must be "necessary and reasonable"; states the policy should not be construed as creating a higher legal standard of care. |
| **Resistance levels and force limits** | 300.3.1: pairs each resistance level with a general limit on force (passive: up to control holds; active: up to pain compliance or takedowns). | 11.10.020(M): names continuum levels without stating what force each level permits. |
| **Vulnerable populations** | 300.1.3(E): core principle calling for particular sensitivity with children, elderly persons, pregnant women, people with disabilities, and people with limited English proficiency. 300.10(a): training on vulnerable populations. | No standalone provision. Factors to consider in determining 'reasonableness' of force: "Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number of officers versus subjects" (11.10.030(A)(2)(I))<br>Tool-specific limits only: expectorant barriers (11.10.050) and Tasers (11.10.100(C)(5)). |

| Topic | Berkeley Policy 300 | MNPD Title 11.10 (July 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| **Pain compliance** | 300.1.4: defines pain compliance. 300.3.5: trained techniques only; three considerations before use; discontinue once compliance is achieved. | Mentioned only within the soft empty-hand definition (11.10.020(GG)) and a reporting exclusion (11.10.200(D)). |
| **Crisis intervention resources** | 300.3.4: a CIT officer, crisis negotiator, or mobile crisis team member "shall be called upon" when available and practicable; officers consider why a subject may be noncompliant. | 11.10.030(N)(3)(b), (d): CIT listed as a resource an officer may request. |
| **Fair and unbiased policing** | 300.1.3(G): core principle requiring force to be used in a fair and unbiased manner, cross-referencing Policy 401, Fair and Impartial Policing. | No provision in Title 11.10. Mentioned elsewhere in MNPD policy (e.g., Biased Based Policing 4.40) |
| **Vehicles as force** | 300.1.4: defines blocking and ramming. 300.5: prohibits ramming or blocking in a manner that reasonably appears to be lethal force, except where deadly force is authorized; limits vehicle containment to stationary or slow-moving vehicles. | 11.10.030(I)(1)–(2): officer positioning and firearm discharges at vehicles. 11.10.030(O)(1)(b): vehicle as defensive impact device, without conditions. |
| **Reporting levels** | 300.6.2: four reporting levels; an uninvolved supervisor responds to Level 2 and 3 incidents; a body-worn camera not activated in time raises a Level 2 incident to Level 3. | No force levels. Whether some soft empty-hand control is entered is left to the supervisor (11.10.200(D)(4)). |
| **Public use of force analysis** | 300.11: de-identified analysis with demographics, force by level, trends, and recommendations. 300.11.1: published quarterly on the Open Data Portal, provided quarterly to the Police Accountability Board, and annually to City Council. | 11.10.210(G)(11): annual analysis provided to the Chief of Police; no publication requirement. |
| **Civilian complaints** | 300.12: complaints about the policy may be filed with Internal Affairs and/or the Police Accountability Board. | No complaint provision. |
| **Annual policy review** | 300.13: the department and the Police Accountability Board convene at least annually to review and update the policy. | 11.10.190(D): annual internal review of directives and lesson plans by the Training Division. |

### 4.2.1 Findings – Comparison with Berkeley Police Department Use of Force Policy

On each topic in Table B, Policy 300 contains a provision that Title 11.10 either lacks or states in narrower terms. The largest differences concern the standard of force itself, pain compliance, vehicles as force, and the provisions that reach the public. Berkeley publishes its use of force analysis quarterly and provides it to its civilian oversight board (Policy 300.11.1), directs complaints to that board as well as to Internal Affairs (300.12), and requires the department and the board to review the policy together each year (300.13). Title 11.10 contains no equivalent of these three provisions.

Policy 300 also shows that these standards can be written as short, specific provisions. Its vulnerable populations principle is a single sentence (300.1.3(E)), and its fair and unbiased policing principle is one sentence that cross-references a separate policy (300.1.3(G)).

# 5. NCRB ANALYSIS – MNPD USE OF FORCE (2024-2025)

## 5.1 Descriptive Analyses

### 5.1.1 Methods

To better understand patterns in MNPD use of force data for 2024 and 2025, the NCRB conducted descriptive analyses of both subject-level records and officer-level records. Data were downloaded from MNPD's public Use of Force Dashboard. All counts and figures reflect the data as of February 2026. These analyses are intended to describe patterns in the available data, not to establish causality. Because the two datasets are organized differently, counts should be interpreted accordingly. For instance, the subject-level dataset includes 813 total subject records, including 403 in 2024 and 410 in 2025. Because there can be multiple subjects of force for each use of force incident, subject-level data is coded as the demographics, the highest level of force used towards each subject by an officer, and the highest level of resistance used by the subject. The officer-level dataset is coded per officer involved in a use of force instance and includes 1,661 officer-level records, including 810 in 2024 and 851 in 2025. Because there can be multiple officers involved in each use of force incident, officer-level data is coded as the demographics, the highest level of force used in that incident by the officer, and the highest level of resistance used by the subject. Table 1 summarizes key demographic characteristics of subjects involved in use of force incidents.

### 5.1.2 Understanding Use of Force Categories

To support accurate interpretation of the data presented in this report, it is important to understand how different types of force are defined within MNPD policy and reporting. The categories below reflect commonly reported force types included in the department's Use of Force Dashboard and referenced throughout this analysis. These definitions are informed by MNPD's Use of Force policy but are presented here in plain language to support public understanding.

#### SOFT EMPTY-HAND CONTROL

Soft empty-hand control refers to physical techniques used to control or restrain a subject without striking them. According to MNPD (2026) policy, these techniques may include grabbing, joint manipulation, pressure points, or controlled takedowns used to gain compliance when a subject resists but does not pose a serious threat. These actions are not impact-based and are generally used at lower levels of resistance. Expanded reporting requirements in 2022 increased documentation of these techniques, including instances without injury.

#### GRAPPLING (HARD EMPTY-HAND CONTROL / PHYSICAL STRUGGLE)

While "grappling" is not always labeled as a standalone category in policy, it reflects more intensive physical engagement between an officer and a subject. MNPD (2026) policy refers to this level of force as "hard empty-hand control," which includes strikes, kicks, or forceful takedowns used to overcome active resistance or aggression. In practice, grappling often involves wrestling, attempts to bring a subject to the ground, or physical struggle during an arrest. These encounters represent a higher level of force and carry increased risk of injury.

#### TASER (CONDUCTED ENERGY WEAPON)

A Taser is a less-lethal weapon designed to temporarily incapacitate a subject by delivering an electrical charge that disrupts muscle control. MNPD (2026) policy classifies the Taser as an intermediate level of force, used when lower levels of force are ineffective or when a subject presents a risk of harm. The policy requires officers to use the minimum number of applications necessary and to follow specific safety and reporting procedures when deploying the device.

FIREARM DISPLAY

Firearm display refers to drawing or aiming a firearm without discharging the weapon. MNPD (2026) policy defines this as an action that signals the potential use of deadly force, even if no shots are fired. Because of the seriousness of this action, firearm displays are considered a reportable use of force and must be documented when they influence the outcome of an encounter. This category was formally added to MNPD reporting requirements in 2019, contributing to increased transparency and higher reported totals.

Understanding these distinctions is critical when interpreting trends in use of force data, particularly as changes in reporting requirements over time have expanded what is documented and classified as force.

## 5.2 Subject Demographics and Incident Characteristics

**Table 1. Subject Demographics (2024-2025)**

| CHARACTERISTIC | CATEGORY | 2024 (N=403) | 2025 (N=410) | TOTAL (N=813) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Race | Black | 61% | 54% | 57% |
| | White | 39% | 43% | 41% |
| | Other | 1% | 3% | 2% |
| Ethnicity | Hispanic | 11% | 14% | 12% |
| | Non-Hispanic | 89% | 86% | 88% |
| Gender | Male | 84% | 83% | 84% |
| | Female | 16% | 17% | 16% |
| Age Group | Under 18 | 10% | 6% | 8% |
| | 18-24 | 20% | 21% | 21% |
| | 25-29 | 15% | 17% | 16% |
| | 30-34 | 18% | 20% | 19% |
| | 35-39 | 11% | 13% | 12% |
| | 40-44 | 10% | 6% | 8% |
| | 45-49 | 7% | 6% | 7% |
| | 50+ | 8% | 8% | 8% |
| | Unknown | 0% | 2% | 1% |

### 5.2.1 Subject Race

As shown in Table 1, across the two-year period, Black subjects of force accounted for the majority of subjects, comprising 57.3% of all subjects. White subjects accounted for 40.7%, and all other subjects of force, recorded as Other, accounted for 2%. In 2024, Black subjects made up 60.5% of subjects and White subjects 38.7%. In 2025, that gap narrowed somewhat, with Black subjects accounting for 54.1% and White subjects 42.7%. Although Black subjects remained the largest racial group in both years, the 2025 data reflect a slight decline in their overall share of subjects relative to 2024. MNPD records race and ethnicity as separate fields, so Table 1 reports them separately, and each subject appears once under race and once under ethnicity. For example, for someone who is both White and Hispanic, their data would be represented in the White category of Race and the Hispanic category of Ethnicity.

Table 1b compares each group's share of subjects of force with its share of Davidson County's population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2025). An index above 1.0 means a group appears among subjects of force more often than its population share

would predict. Black subjects had an index of 2.20, nearly the same as in the 2024 report (2.21). Population share does not account for differences in rates of circumstances like police contact, so the index describes the size of a disparity, not its causes.

**Table 1b. Subject Race Disproportionality Index**

| SUBJECT RACE / ETHNICITY | FORCE EVENTS (%) | 2024-2025 POP. (%) | DISPROPORTIONALITY INDEX (NEW) | DISPROPORTIONALITY INDEX (2024) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| White | 41% | 66.3% | 0.62 | 0.52 |
| Black | 57% | 25.9% | 2.20 | 2.21 |
| Other | 2% | 7.7% | 0.26 | 0.18 |
| Hispanic | 12% | 14.4% | 0.83 | 0.95 |
| Non-Hispanic | 88% | 85.6% | 1.03 | - |

U.S. Census Bureau. (2025). QuickFacts: Davidson County, Tennessee. Population estimates, July 1, 2024 (V2024). Retrieved from https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/davidsoncountytennessee

### 5.2.2 Subject Gender

Subjects of force were overwhelmingly male in both years. In 2024, 84.1% of subjects were male and 15.9% were female. In 2025, the pattern remained nearly identical, with 83.4% male and 16.6% female. Across both years combined, 83.8% of subjects were male and 16.2% were female. As in many prior analyses of police use of force, these figures indicate that force incidents were concentrated among male subjects.

### 5.2.3 Subject Age

Subjects of force were concentrated primarily among younger adults. Across both years combined, the largest age groups were 18-24 (20.7%), 30-34 (18.9%), and 25-29 (16.1%). Taken together, subjects between the ages of 18 and 34 accounted for 56% of all subjects of force.

Youth under age 18 represented 8.1% of subjects of force overall, though that share declined from 10.4% in 2024 to 5.9% in 2025. Subjects ages 40-44 accounted for 8.1% of the total, those ages 45–49 for 6.6%, and those aged 50 and older for 7.9%. This distribution indicates that use of force incidents are concentrated among younger adult populations, with a noticeable decline in youth involvement between 2024 and 2025.

## 5.3 Type of Force Used Per Subject

**Table 2. Type of Force Used by Year**

| FORCE TYPE USED | 2024 (N=403) | 2025 (N=410) | TOTAL (N=813) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Soft Empty Hand | 25% | 41% | 33% |
| Grappling | 5% | <1% | 3% |
| Chemical Spray | <1% | <1% | <1% |
| Taser Deploy | 26% | 29% | 27% |
| Tear Gas | <1% | 0% | <1% |
| Other Physical | 1% | 2% | 2% |
| Take Down | 28% | 15% | 21% |
| Hand Strikes | 0% | 5% | 3% |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Knee Strikes | <1% | 1% | <1% |
| Foot Strikes | 6% | <1% | 3% |
| Other Weapon | 1% | <1% | <1% |
| Baton | 0% | <1% | <1% |
| K9 | 6% | 4% | 5% |
| Firearm | 1% | <1% | <1% |

The highest level of force used per subject was concentrated in a relatively small number of categories (Table 2). Across both years combined, the most common categories were Soft Empty Hand (33.09%), Taser Deploy (27.43%), and Take Down (21.28%). Smaller shares of subjects were associated with K9 (4.80%), Foot Strikes (3.44%), Grappling (3.08%), and Hand Strikes (2.58%), while all remaining categories each accounted for less than 2.0% of subjects. The distribution shifted notably between years. In 2024, the most common highest-force categories were Take Down (27.79%), Taser Deploy (26.05%), and Soft Empty Hand (24.57%). In 2025, Soft Empty Hand increased substantially to 41.46%, becoming the most common highest-force category, while Taser Deploy remained common at 28.78% and Take Down declined to 14.88%. Additional changes were observed across less frequent categories. Hand Strikes was not recorded as the highest force used in 2024 but accounted for 5.12% of subjects in 2025. By contrast, Grappling declined from 5.21% in 2024 to 0.98% in 2025, and Foot Strikes declined from 6.45% to 0.49%. These findings suggest an increase in use and/or reporting frequency for lower-level force categories, particularly Soft Empty Hand techniques. This was observed alongside a decline in higher-contact physical tactics such as Take Downs and Foot Strikes between 2024 and 2025.

**Table 3. Context-Coded Type of Force Used by Year**

| FORCE TYPE | 2024 (N=403) | 2025 (N=410) | TOTAL (N=813) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Soft Empty Hand (Non Injury) | 7% | 16% | 11% |
| Soft Empty Hand (Injury) | 19% | 23% | 21% |
| Taser (Display Only) | 1% | 3% | 2% |
| Firearm (Display Only) | 4% | 2% | 3% |
| Taser Deployed | 26% | 29% | 27% |
| Chemical Spray | 1% | 1% | 1% |
| All Other Less Lethal Weapons | 6% | 4% | 5% |
| Hard Empty Hand Control | 35% | 22% | 29% |
| Baton Strikes | 0% | <1% | <1% |
| Firearm Discharge | <1% | 0% | <1% |

As shown in Table 3, the context-coded subject-level force table provides a more detailed view of force by distinguishing, for example, between display-only and deployed force, and between injury and non-injury variants of soft empty hand force. Across both years combined, the most common categories were Hard Empty Hand Control (28.54%), Taser Deployed (27.31%), Soft Empty Hand (Injury) (21.16%), and Soft Empty Hand (Non-Injury) (11.32%). Smaller shares were recorded for All Other Less Lethal Weapons (5.04%), Firearm (Display Only) (3.08%), and Taser (Display Only) (2.21%), while all other categories each accounted for less than 1.0% of subjects. The distribution changed between years. In 2024, the largest categories were Hard Empty Hand Control (34.99%), Taser Deployed (26.05%), and Soft Empty Hand (Injury) (19.11%). In 2025, Taser Deployed remained common at 28.54%, but Hard Empty Hand Control declined to 22.20%, while both Soft Empty Hand (Injury) and Soft Empty Hand (Non-Injury) increased to 23.17% and 15.85%, respectively. The share of Firearm (Display Only) declined from 4.22% in 2024 to

1.95% in 2025. Baton Strikes was not recorded in 2024 and accounted for 0.24% of subjects in 2025. Overall, subject-coded force was concentrated in a relatively small number of categories, particularly Hard Empty Hand Control, Taser Deployed, and Soft Empty Hand. These findings suggest a shift toward lower-level force and greater reliance on soft empty hand techniques, including both injury and non-injury variants, while higher-force categories remained relatively uncommon.

## 5.4 Subject Resistance

### UNDERSTANDING SUBJECT RESISTANCE CATEGORIES

To support interpretation of the subject resistance data presented in this report, the NCRB provides plain language descriptions of the resistance categories used in MNPD's public Use of Force data. MNPD's Department Manual defines broader concepts of subject behavior, including passive resistance, active resistance, active aggression, and aggravated active aggression. However, the manual does not separately define each of the specific resistance categories appearing in the public dataset. MNPD Form 108 also uses related, but not identical, reporting options such as Passive Resistance, Active Resistance, Attempt to Flee/Escape, Incited Bystanders, Assaulted Officer Physically, and Assaulted Officer with Weapon. Accordingly, the descriptions below are provided in plain language to assist readers in understanding the categories used in this analysis and should not be interpreted as official MNPD definitions.

**Table 4. Descriptions of Subject Resistance Categories Reported by MNPD**

| SUBJECT RESISTANCE TYPE | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| Assault – Cutting | Assaultive conduct recorded as involving a cutting instrument. |
| Assault – Firearm | Assaultive conduct recorded as involving a firearm. |
| Assault – Other Weapon | Assaultive conduct recorded as involving a weapon other than the separately identified firearm, cutting instrument, or vehicle categories. |
| Assault – Physical | An encounter recorded as involving a physical assault without a weapon. |
| Assault – Vehicle | Assaultive conduct recorded as involving a vehicle as a weapon. |
| Resist – Flee | An encounter in which the subject was recorded as attempting to flee or escape. |
| Resist – Incite Others | An encounter in which the subject was recorded as inciting others or bystanders during the encounter. |
| Resist – Other | Resistance recorded under an "other" category rather than one of the specifically identified resistance types. |
| Resist – Passive | Noncompliance without physical defiance or resistive movement against an officer's efforts. |

The most commonly reported subject resistance type across the two-year period was fleeing, which accounted for 42.3% of subjects. This category was relatively stable across years, comprising 43.4% of cases in 2024 and 41.2% in 2025. The next most common categories were resist – other (19.3%) and assault – physical (17.2%).

Several forms of weapon-related assault were less common but still notable. Across both years, assault with a firearm accounted for 9.5% of subjects, assault with another weapon for 3.3%, and assault with a cutting instrument for 3.0%. Passive resistance remained rare at 2.1%, and unknown resistance accounted for 2.2% of cases. Compared with 2024, 2025 showed a modest increase in physical assault and resist – other, alongside a decline in several weapon-related assault categories.

**Table 5. Subject Resistance Types by Year**

| RESISTANCE TYPE | 2024 (N=403) | 2025 (N=410) | TOTAL (N=813) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assault - Cutting | 4% | 1% | 3% |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assault - Firearm | 10% | 9% | 9% |
| Assault - Other Weapon | 5% | 2% | 3% |
| Assault - Physical | 15% | 19% | 17% |
| Assault - Vehicle | <1% | <1% | <1% |
| Resist - Flee | 43% | 41% | 42% |
| Resist - Incite Others | <1% | <1% | <1% |
| Resist - Other | 17% | 22% | 19% |
| Resist - Passive | 2% | 2% | 2% |

## 5.5 Reported Reason for Force by Year

**Table 6. Reported Reason for Force by Year**

| REASON FOR FORCE | 2024 (N=403) | 2025 (N=410) | TOTAL (N=813) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Defense of Other(s) | 4% | 7% | 6% |
| Defense of Self | 13% | 8% | 10% |
| Disobeyed Lawful Command | 20% | 32% | 26% |
| Other Reason | 3% | 9% | 6% |
| Resisted Arrest | 60% | 44% | 52% |

The most commonly reported reason for force across the two-year period was resisted arrest, which accounted for 52.0% of all subjects. However, that category declined notably from 59.8% in 2024 to 44.4% in 2025. At the same time, disobeyed lawful command increased from 20.1% of subjects in 2024 to 32.2% in 2025, making it the second most common reported reason overall (26.2% across both years).

Other reported reasons were less common. Defense of self accounted for 10.3% of subjects overall, though it declined from 12.9% in 2024 to 7.8% in 2025. Defense of other(s) increased from 4.0% to 7.1%, while other reason increased from 3.2% to 8.5%. Taken together, these figures suggest that while resisting arrest remained the most frequently reported justification for force, the distribution of officer-reported reasons shifted somewhat in 2025.

Additional data obtained from Metro Criminal Justice Planning (Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Criminal Justice Planning, 2026) show that physical arrests involving a resisting arrest charge increased slightly from 1,054 in 2024 to 1,078 in 2025, even as the share of use of force incidents in which “resisted arrest” was reported as the reason for force declined from 59.8% to 44.4%. Court outcome data also show varied dispositions for resisting arrest charges, including guilty dispositions, dismissals, nolle prosequi dispositions, and cases proceeding to Criminal Court. Because these datasets cannot be linked at the incident level, they do not establish the outcomes of resisting arrest allegations arising from specific use of force incidents. However, given that resisted arrest was the most frequently reported reason for force, the relationship between use of force, resisting arrest charges, and subsequent case outcomes warrants further examination beyond the scope of this report.

## 5.6 Subject-Level Descriptive Takeaways

Taken together, the subject-level data show that subject counts were similar across 2024 and 2025. Across both years, subjects were predominantly male, Black, and most commonly fell between ages 18 and 34. ‘Resisted Arrest’ remained the most common reported reason for force, ‘Resist – Flee’ the most common resistance type. The force type distribution tables further indicate that force was concentrated in a relatively small number of categories, particularly

Soft Empty Hand, Taser Deploy, Take Down, and Hard Empty Hand Control, although the distribution of those categories shifted meaningfully between years.

## 5.7 Officer-Level Use of Force Descriptive Overview

**Table 7. Officer Force Interactions by Year**

| YEAR | RECORDS | PERCENTAGE |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 810 | 49% |
| 2025 | 851 | 51% |
| Total | 1661 | 100% |

To better understand patterns in MNPD use of force activity at the officer level, descriptive analyses were conducted on all Use of Force interactions per MNPD officer in 2024-2025. The counts reported here reflect officer-level force records, not necessarily unique incidents or unique officers.

Across the two-year period, this dataset includes 1,661 officer-level records, including 810 in 2024 and 851 in 2025. This reflects a modest increase in the number of officer-coded force records in 2025.

### 5.7.1 Officer Demographics

#### OFFICER RACE/ETHNICITY

The officers represented in these records were predominantly White, male, and not Hispanic. Across both years combined, White officers accounted for 80.7% of officer-level force records, while officers coded as Other accounted for 13.3% and Black officers accounted for 6.0%. The share of records involving White officers declined from 82.3% in 2024 to 79.2% in 2025, while the share involving officers coded as Other increased from 11.9% to 14.7%. With respect to ethnicity, 93.9% of officer-level records involved officers coded as Not Hispanic, while 6.1% involved officers coded as Hispanic.

#### OFFICER GENDER

Male officers accounted for the large majority of officer-level force records in both years. Across 2024 and 2025 combined, 92.2% of records involved male officers and 7.8% involved female officers. This pattern remained stable across years, with male officers accounting for 92.0% of records in 2024 and 92.5% in 2025.

**Table 8. Demographics – Officer Force Interactions**

| CHARACTERISTIC | CATEGORY | 2024 (N=810) | 2025 (N=851) | TOTAL (N=1661) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Race | White | 82% | 79% | 81% |
| | Other | 12% | 15% | 13% |
| | Black | 6% | 6% | 6% |
| Ethnicity | Not Hispanic | 95% | 93% | 94% |
| | Hispanic | 5% | 7% | 6% |
| Gender | Male | 92% | 92% | 92% |
| | Female | 8% | 8% | 8% |

### 5.7.2 MNPD Department Composition and Workforce Characteristics

Understanding the composition of MNPD provides important context for interpreting patterns in use of force. Research suggests that officer characteristics, including race, gender, and experience, may shape enforcement patterns and use of force decisions (Ba et al., 2021). As such, examining the demographic makeup of MNPD offers insight into the structural context within which use of force occurs. According to data from MNPD's public dashboard, the department consists of sworn personnel, trainees, and civilian staff, each contributing to overall operations. The following breakdown of MNPD personnel demographics reflects the values reported on MNPD's Employee Demographics public dashboard in October 2026.

#### SWORN OFFICERS

MNPD currently employs 1,076 sworn officers. The racial composition of sworn personnel is as follows:

- 77.5% White
- 10.4% Black
- 5.4% Hispanic
- 1.4% Asian
- 5.3% Other

#### SUPERVISORY RANKS

Representation varies by rank. Sergeants and lieutenants have somewhat higher shares of White officers than the sworn force overall. Captains and Above have the highest proportion of Black officers out of all sworn personnel subgroups (19.2%):

- Sergeants (n = 336)
  - 81.8% White
  - 11.6% Black
  - 2.7% Hispanic
  - 2.4% Asian
  - 1.5% Other
- Lieutenants (n = 99)
  - 83.8% White
  - 11.1% Black
  - 2% Hispanic
  - 3% Other
- Captains and Above (n = 52)
  - 78.8% White
  - 19.2% Black
  - 1.9% Hispanic

#### TRAINEES

The department currently, as of October 2026, has 73 trainees, with the following composition:

- 75.3% White
- 17.8% Black
- 4.1% Hispanic
- 2.7% Other

#### CIVILIAN STAFF

MNPD employs 507 civilian personnel, whose roles include administrative, technical, and support functions:

- 67.5% White

- 23.3% Black
- 4.7% Hispanic
- 1.2% Asian
- 3.4% Other

These data indicate that MNPD's workforce is predominantly White (~77%), with comparatively lower representation of Black, Hispanic, Asian, and 'Other' officers. While civilian staff show somewhat greater racial diversity, sworn personnel, who are directly responsible for enforcement actions, remain less representative of Nashville's broader population. Research suggests that officer diversity may influence patterns of police interaction, including the frequency and severity of use of force. As such, these demographic patterns provide important context for interpreting disparities identified in this report and for evaluating ongoing efforts related to recruitment, retention, and promotion within MNPD. These structural characteristics are not determinative of individual officer behavior; however, they provide an important contextual lens through which patterns in use of force, disparities, and accountability outcomes can be understood.

### 5.7.3 Officer Years of Service

**Table 9. Distribution of Force Incidents by Officer YOS**

| YEARS OF SERVICE | 2024 (N=810) | 2025 (N=851) | TOTAL (N=1661) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 00 to 01 | 6% | 8% | 7% |
| 01 to 05 | 59% | 64% | 61% |
| 06 to 10 | 22% | 20% | 21% |
| 11 to 15 | 6% | 6% | 6% |
| 16 to 20 | 3% | 2% | 3% |
| 21 to 25 | 2% | 1% | 1% |
| More than 25 | 1% | 0% | 1% |

Officer-level force records were concentrated among officers with relatively fewer years of service. Across both years combined, officers with 1 to 5 years of service accounted for 61.5% of records, followed by officers with 6 to 10 years of service (21.1%). Officers with less than 1 year of service accounted for 7.0%, while those with 11 to 15 years accounted for 6.0%. Officers with more than 15 years of service represented comparatively small shares of the total.

Some year-to-year shifts are visible in these data. The share of records involving officers with 1 to 5 years of service increased from 59.0% in 2024 to 63.8% in 2025, while the share involving officers with 16 or more years of service declined. Taken together, these figures indicate that officer-level force records were concentrated primarily among early-career and lower mid-career officers.

**Table 10. Distribution of Officers with Multiple Force Interactions by Officer YOS**

| OFFICER INTERACTIONS | 0-1 YOS | 1-5 YOS | 6-10 YOS | 11-15 YOS | 16-20 YOS | 21-25 YOS | MORE THAN 25 YOS | TOTAL OFFICERS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 to 3 | 64 | 244 | 97 | 51 | 26 | 11 | 11 | 504 |
| 4 to 6 | 11 | 64 | 18 | 2 | 2 | 1 | | 98 |
| 7 to 9 | 3 | 17 | 9 | | | | | 29 |
| 10+ | 1 | 11 | | | | | | 12 |

Across 2024 and 2025, a total of 643 officers were associated with at least one recorded use of force incident. Of these, 379 officers (58.9%) were involved in more than one use of force incident, while 264 officers (41.1%) were associated with only a single incident. Most repeat-use of force officers had a relatively small number of incidents. Specifically, 240

officers (63.3%) had 2 to 3 incidents, 98 (25.9%) had 4 to 6 incidents, 29 (7.7%) had 7 to 9 incidents, and 12 (3.2%) had 10 or more incidents over the two-year period. Repeat use of force officers were concentrated in the earlier years-of-service groups.

Among officers with more than one use of force incident, 227 (59.9%) were in the 1 to 5 years of service category, 71 (18.7%) were in the 6 to 10 years category, and 52 (13.7%) were in the 0 to 1 year category. Much smaller numbers fell in the more senior groups, including 17 officers (4.5%) with 11 to 15 years of service, 8 (2.1%) with 16 to 20 years, 3 (0.8%) with 21 to 25 years, and 1 (0.3%) with more than 25 years. Thus, repeat involvement in use of force incidents was concentrated primarily among officers with relatively low total incident counts and among officers in the earlier stages of their careers.

### 5.7.4 Officer Injury Result

Officer injury was relatively uncommon in the officer-level records. Across both years combined, 96.75% of officer-level force records were coded as No Injury, while 3.25% were coded as Injury. In 2024, 95.80% of records were coded as No Injury and 4.20% as Injury; in 2025, 97.65% were coded as No Injury and 2.35% as Injury.

### 5.7.5 Subject Resistance Type (Coded per Involved Officer)

The most common resistance type recorded in officer-level force records across both years was Resist – Flee, which accounted for 36.3% of records. The next most common categories were Resist – Other (23.4%) and 'Assault – Physical' (18.4%). Weapon-related assault categories were less common but remained notable: 'Assault – Firearm' accounted for 8.8% of records, 'Assault – Other Weapon' for 3.9%, and 'Assault – Cutting' for 3.4%. Several shifts occurred between years. 'Assault – Physical' increased from 15.4% of records in 2024 to 21.2% in 2025, while 'Assault – Cutting' declined from 5.7% to 1.3%, and 'Assault – Other Weapon' declined from 5.6% to 2.2%. The share of records coded as Resist – Flee remained relatively stable across both years.

**Table 11. Resistance Type – Officer Force Interactions**

| RESISTANCE TYPE | 2024 (N=810) | 2025 (N=851) | TOTAL (N=1661) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assault - Cutting | 6% | 1% | 3% |
| Assault - Firearm | 8% | 10% | 9% |
| Assault - Other Weapon | 6% | 2% | 4% |
| Assault - Physical | 15% | 21% | 18% |
| Assault - Vehicle | 1% | 0% | <1% |
| Resist - Flee | 37% | 36% | 36% |
| Resist - Incite Others | 1% | 1% | 1% |
| Resist - Other | 23% | 24% | 23% |
| Resist - Passive | 2% | 2% | 2% |
| Unknown | 2% | 2% | 2% |

### 5.7.6 Force Type (Coded per Involved Officer)

Force type recorded per involved officer is summarized in Tables 13a-b. Across both years combined, the most common force type was Soft Empty Hand, which accounted for 975 records (58.70%). The next most common categories were Hand Strikes (15.29%) and Other Physical (14.45%). All other force types accounted for relatively small shares of the total. The distribution shifted substantially between years. Soft Empty Hand increased from 48.77% of officer-level records in 2024 to 68.16% in 2025. Over the same period, Other Physical declined from 20.99% to 8.23%, Grappling

declined from 6.67% to 0.47%, and Baton declined from 3.58% to 0.24%. The category Other Weapon was not recorded in 2024 and accounted for 2.47% of records in 2025.

**Table 12a. Force Type – Per Officer Interactions**

| FORCE TYPE | 2024 (N=810) | 2025 (N=851) | TOTAL (N=1661) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Soft Empty Hand | 49% | 68% | **59%** |
| Grappling | 7% | <1% | **3%** |
| Take Down | <1% | <1% | **<1%** |
| Hand Strikes | 14% | 16% | **15%** |
| Knee Strikes | <1% | 0% | **<1%** |
| Foot Strikes | 1% | 1% | **1%** |
| Other Physical | 21% | 8% | **14%** |
| Other Weapon | 0% | 2% | **1%** |
| Tear Gas | <1% | 1% | **<1%** |
| Baton | 4% | <1% | **2%** |
| Chemical Spray | <1% | <1% | **<1%** |
| K9 | 0% | <1% | **<1%** |
| Taser Deploy[1] | 3% | 2% | **2%** |
| Firearm | <1% | <1% | **<1%** |

**Table 12b. Context-Coded Force Type – Per Officer Interactions**

| FORCE TYPE | 2024 (N=810) | 2025 (N=851) | TOTAL (N=1661) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Soft Empty Hand (Non Injury) | 27% | 34% | **31%** |
| Soft Empty Hand (Injury) | 29% | 32% | **31%** |
| Taser (Display Only) | 0% | 2% | **<1%** |
| Firearm (Display Only) | 0% | 2% | **<1%** |
| Taser Deployed | 14% | 16% | **15%** |
| Chemical Spray | 1% | <1% | **<1%** |
| All Other Less Lethal Weapons | 3% | 2% | **3%** |
| Hard Empty Hand Control | 25% | 12% | **18%** |
| Baton Strikes | 0% | <1% | **<1%** |
| Firearm Discharge | <1% | <1% | **<1%** |

[1] Regarding Officer Force Type data, and Taser Deployment data in particular, there is a discrepancy in MNPD Use of Force Dashboard data between the two columns denoting 'highest force used' in each incident. Additionally, the column of data included in Table 12a does not match the subject-level dataset summarizing 'highest force used' taser events. Table 12b summarizes the Force Level column, which shows no noticeable errors.

### 5.7.7 Precinct Distribution


Officer-level force records were distributed across all listed precincts, though some precincts accounted for larger shares than others. Across both years combined, the largest shares were recorded in Central (19.1%), South (14.9%), East (11.1%), North (10.4%), Southeast (9.5%), and Hermitage (9.4%). Madison accounted for 9.1% of records, followed by Midtown Hills (7.6%) and West (3.9%). Records with a blank precinct value accounted for 5.1% of the total.

There were also some notable year-to-year shifts. Madison increased from 7.2% of officer-level records in 2024 to 10.9% in 2025, while South increased from 13.7% to 16.1%. By contrast, Midtown Hills declined from 8.8% in 2024 to 6.5% in 2025, and Hermitage declined from 10.5% to 8.3%.

### 5.7.8 Incident Zip Code

Incident zip codes were spread across multiple areas, with several zip codes accounting for larger shares of the total. Across both years combined, the most frequently recorded zip codes were 37201 (10.05%), 37207 (9.27%), 37013 (7.83%), and 37210 (7.65%). Blank zip code values accounted for 5.12% of the total.

**Figure 1. Heat map of use of force incidents per zip code**




### 5.7.9 Officer-Level Descriptive Takeaways

Taken together, these officer-level descriptive data show that the total number of officer-coded use of force records increased slightly from 2024 to 2025. Across both years, these records were concentrated among male officers, White officers, non-Hispanic officers, and officers with 1 to 5 years of service. The racial composition of these records is close to that of MNPD's sworn workforce, so these findings are reflective of who MNPD officers are, as much as they show who is predominantly using force in these instances. The records were most commonly associated with Central and South precincts, and with subject resistance coded as fleeing, other resistance, or physical assault. At the force-type level, Soft Empty Hand was the most common category in both years and increased substantially in 2025. Overall, the data suggest relative stability in the volume of officer-level force records across the two years, alongside some notable shifts in the distribution of force types, precinct location, and years of service.

## 5.8 Bivariate Analyses

### 5.8.1 Methods

To identify meaningful associations between Use of Force Incident variables (e.g. the distribution of force types used across resistance type categories), we conducted chi-square tests of independence for bivariate associations. Where small expected frequencies were present, p-values were obtained by Monte-Carlo simulation (10,000 replicates). Effect sizes are reported as Cramer's V and interpreted with conventional thresholds. Because officer-level records are not independent (one incident can produce several records, and many officers appear more than once), p-values may overstate statistical significance; results should be read as descriptive associations.

### 5.8.2 Data Description

Whereas the descriptive analyses in this report focus on 2024-2025 MNPD Use of Force data to provide a snapshot of recent use of force patterns, for the bivariate analyses we analyzed a much larger sample (N=2550) of MNPD officer-level Use of Force interactions from 2021-2025 in order to provide a larger and more reliable sample for statistical testing.

Using five years of data improves the stability and statistical power of our chi-square analyses, particularly for less common force types, resistance categories, and officer subgroups. This reduces the likelihood that results are driven by small cell sizes or short-term fluctuations. Officer-level records were chosen for this analysis because several research questions concern officer characteristics and behaviors, including years of service, race/ethnicity, force type used, and officer injury. This approach allows us to pair a current descriptive overview with a stronger statistical assessment of how many of our key use of force variables are meaningfully related.

### 5.8.3 Summary Table of Bivariate Tests

**Table 13. Bivariate Associations ($\chi^2$ with Monte-Carlo p-values)**

| VARIABLE A | VARIABLE B | $X^2$ | P | SIG. | CRAMER'S V | EFFECT SIZE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reason force was used | Force outcome severity | 546.24 | < .001 | *** | 0.234 | Moderate |
| Subject resistance type | Force outcome severity | 500.30 | < .001 | *** | 0.223 | Moderate |
| Officer years of service (ranges) | Force outcome severity | 255.64 | < .001 | *** | 0.160 | Weak |
| Force outcome severity | Officer injury (yes/no) | 35.02 | < .001 | *** | 0.118 | Weak |
| Precinct | Force outcome severity | 95.21 | < .001 | *** | 0.097 | Very weak |
| Officer gender | Force outcome severity | 13.21 | = .013 | * | 0.073 | Very weak |
| Officer race/ethnicity | Force outcome severity | 13.71 | = .088 | | 0.052 | Very weak |

Notes. $\chi^2$ = Pearson chi-square; p values from Monte-Carlo simulation (10,000 replicates) when applicable. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Effect size via Cramer's V.

### 5.8.4 Reason for Force and Outcome Severity

Figure 2. Distribution of Type of Force Used by Reported Reason for Force (Proportional bar chart)






Figure 3. Standardized Residual Heatmap - Distribution of Type of Force Used by Reported Reason for Force




Positive residuals indicate combinations that occurred more often than expected under independence; negative residuals indicate combinations that occurred less often than expected.

To assess whether the reason officers reported for using force was associated with the severity of the force used, a chi-square test was conducted comparing reported reason for force with the ordered type of force used. The test found a statistically significant association between these variables, $\chi^2 = 546.24$, $p < .001$. This indicates that the level of force used varied significantly depending on the reason officers reported for using force. In other words, the reason officers cited for using force was related to the level of force ultimately used. The effect size was moderate (Cramer's V = 0.234), suggesting that the relationship is substantively meaningful, not merely statistically significant due to sample size.

While this analysis does not establish causation, it does indicate that the justification officers provided for using force was meaningfully associated with the level of force used in an incident. Incidents justified as defense of self appear more likely to involve higher-severity force options, while incidents involving resisting arrest appear more concentrated in lower-level force, especially soft empty hand tactics.

The heatmap of standardized residuals helps clarify which combinations of reported reason for force and force type contributed most strongly to this relationship. The strongest bivariate relationships were found in incidents coded as defense of self. These incidents were substantially overrepresented among firearm and impact weapon uses and underrepresented among soft empty hand control force incidents. By contrast, incidents coded as resisted arrest were overrepresented among soft empty hand control incidents and underrepresented among firearm uses. Incidents involving disobedience of a lawful command were also overrepresented among chemical spray or Taser uses.

#### CONCLUSION/POLICY TAKEAWAY

These patterns suggest that the reason officers reported for using force was meaningfully associated with the type and severity of force used in practice. That certain justifications are more often associated with higher levels of force highlights a couple of areas for MNPD policy review and improvement.

For instance, the association between disobedience of a lawful command and chemical spray/Taser use suggests a need to review whether policy clearly limits the use of pain compliance or conducted energy weapons in response to lower-level noncompliance. MNPD may benefit from strengthening policy language requiring de-escalation, verbal warnings where feasible, and documentation explaining why less severe alternatives were not sufficient.

Incidents coded as defense of self also warrant close scrutiny, because they were more likely to involve higher-severity force, particularly firearm and impact weapon uses. MNPD should consider whether policy and training provide sufficiently clear guidance on how officers should assess and document imminent threat, proportionality, and alternative responses in these incidents. These cases may also merit enhanced supervisory review given their association with more severe force.

### 5.8.5 Subject resistance type × Force outcome severity

**Figure 4. Proportional bar chart - Distribution of Subject Resistance Type by Force Outcome Severity**





**Figure 5. Standardized residual heatmap - Distribution of Subject Resistance Type by Force Outcome Severity**




A chi-square test indicated a statistically significant association between subject resistance type and the type of force used, $\chi^2 = 500.30$, $p < .001$. The effect size was moderate (Cramer's V = 0.223), indicating a meaningful relationship between the type of resistance reported and the level of force used. This suggests that force outcomes varied systematically across resistance categories rather than occurring randomly.

A closer look at the standardized residual values for each pair allows us to interpret which combinations of resistance and force contributed most strongly to this relationship. The clearest pattern appears in incidents involving assault with a firearm, which were substantially overrepresented among firearm force incidents and underrepresented among soft empty hand control incidents. A similar pattern is visible for assault with a cutting instrument, which was also more common than expected in firearm force incidents and less common than expected in soft empty hand control incidents. These findings suggest that weapon-related assaultive resistance was associated with higher-severity force outcomes.

Other assaultive resistance categories also showed distinct patterns. Physical assault was overrepresented among impact weapon incidents, suggesting that this resistance type was more likely to be associated with intermediate weapon force than with lower-level control tactics. Assault involving other weapons also appears to be associated more often than expected with chemical/Taser uses, further indicating that more serious assaultive resistance tended to correspond with elevated force responses.

Lower-level resistance categories were more closely associated with lower- or mid-level force. Passive resistance was overrepresented among chemical or Taser incidents, while other resistance was strongly overrepresented among soft empty hand control force incidents. Fleeing resistance was overrepresented among hard empty hand control and underrepresented among firearm force. Taken together, these patterns indicate that lower-level or less directly assaultive resistance categories were generally associated with less severe force outcomes than weapon-related assaultive resistance.

## CONCLUSION/POLICY TAKEAWAY

Overall, these findings suggest that MNPD's use of force severity generally varies in patterned ways with resistance type. More specifically, resistance involving firearms, cutting instruments, or other weapons tended to be associated with higher-severity force, while passive resistance, fleeing, and other lower-level resistance categories were more often associated with lower-level force options. Although this analysis does not establish causation or assess whether force

was necessary or proportionate, it does highlight several areas where MNPD policy, guidance/training, and documentation could be improved.

First, the association between passive resistance and chemical/Taser force warrants closer policy review. Because passive resistance is generally lower on the resistance continuum, MNPD should assess whether current policy provides sufficiently clear limits on when pain compliance tools or conducted energy weapons may be used in response to non-assaultive behavior. This may be an area where de-escalation requirements, supervisory review, or additional policy clarification would be beneficial.

Additionally, the strong relationship between weapon-related assaultive resistance and firearm force incidents suggests a need for continued emphasis on scenario-based training, especially around decision-making, threat assessment, and proportionality. Even where elevated force may be expected, such as assaultive resistance with a cutting weapon (e.g. a knife), policy and training should reinforce that officers must continually reassess the threat and use the least force reasonably necessary under the circumstances.

Finally, the results highlight the importance of improving the classification and documentation of resistance categories. Broad categories such as “other resistance” may obscure important differences in subject behavior and make it harder to evaluate whether force was proportional. MNPD should consider refining resistance definitions and requiring more detailed narrative explanations when ambiguous categories are used.

### 5.8.6 Officer years of service (ranges) × Force outcome severity

**Figure 6. Proportional bar chart - Distribution of Officer Years of Service by Force Outcome Severity**





**Figure 7. Standardized residual heatmap - Distribution of Officer Years of Service by Force Outcome Severity**




To assess whether officer experience was associated with the level of force used, a chi-square test was conducted comparing officer years of service with the ordered type of force used. The test found a statistically significant association between these variables, $\chi^2 = 255.64$, $p < .001$. This indicates that force outcomes were not distributed evenly across officer experience categories. In other words, the level of force used varied somewhat depending on officers' years of service.

However, the effect size for this relationship (Cramer's V = 0.160) indicates that this is only a weak association. This suggests that although the relationship was statistically significant, officer years of service was only modestly related to force outcome in substantive terms. Therefore, years of service may play some role in shaping force patterns, but it does not appear to be a particularly strong factor on its own.

A closer look at the standardized residual values for each pair allows us to interpret which experience-force combinations were driving the overall significant chi-square result. Positive residuals indicate combinations that occurred more often than would be expected if years of service and force type were unrelated, while negative residuals indicate combinations that occurred less often than expected. Cells with absolute residual values greater than 2 are the most important contributors to the association.

Several patterns stand out. Officers with 1 to 5 years of service were strongly underrepresented among chemical or Taser incidents and somewhat overrepresented among soft empty hand control and hard empty hand control incidents. This suggests that officers in this experience range were less likely than expected to be involved in chemical or Taser force and somewhat more likely to be involved in lower-level physical control tactics.

By contrast, officers with 6 to 10 years of service and 11 to 15 years of service were overrepresented among chemical or Taser incidents. This indicates that mid-career officers were more likely than expected to be involved in this type of force. Officers with 16 to 20 years of service and those with more than 25 years of service also appear somewhat overrepresented among firearm incidents, suggesting that more experienced officers were involved in firearm force more often than expected, though these patterns are less pronounced than the chemical or Taser findings for mid-career officers.

CONCLUSION/POLICY TAKEAWAY

Taken together, these findings suggest that officer experience was associated with force outcome, but only modestly. Certain experience groups were somewhat more likely to be associated with particular force types, especially mid-career officers with chemical or Taser force and early-career officers with lower-level physical force. Although these patterns are notable, the weak effect size indicates that years of service was not a dominant factor in explaining differences in force level overall.

However, these results highlight some patterns which may warrant targeted reviews of training, supervision, and force reporting across career stages.

First, the pattern showing early-career officers more often associated with lower-level physical force and mid-career officers more often associated with chemical/Taser force suggests that MNPD should review whether training on de-escalation, force alternatives, and threat assessment is reinforced consistently throughout an officer's career, rather than concentrated primarily at entry. Refresher training may be especially important for officers in mid-career stages.

Second, the apparent overrepresentation of more experienced officers in firearm force incidents may warrant closer supervisory and administrative review, even if the overall relationship is weak. MNPD may wish to examine whether these incidents reflect assignment patterns, specialized roles, or other contextual factors, and whether existing policy guidance for high-severity force is being applied consistently across experience levels.

Third, these findings support the value of career-stage-based auditing of force incidents. Routine review of force patterns by years of service could help identify whether certain force options are concentrated within particular experience groups and whether those patterns point to training needs, supervisory issues, or deployment-related explanations.

Finally, because the relationship between years of service and force outcome was weak, policy responses should focus less on experience alone and more on how experience interacts with other factors, such as assignment type, resistance level, incident context, and supervisor oversight. MNPD may benefit from incorporating years of service into broader early-intervention or force-review systems, rather than treating it as a standalone risk factor.

### 5.8.7 Force outcome severity × Officer injury (yes/no)

**Figure 8. Proportional bar chart – Officer Injury Result by Force Outcome Severity**





**Figure 9. Standardized residual heatmap – Officer Injury Result by Force Outcome Severity**





To assess whether some types of force were more likely than others to be associated with officer injury, a chi-square test was conducted comparing the type of force used with whether an officer injury was reported. The association was statistically significant, $\chi^2 = 35.02$, $p < .001$, indicating that injury was not evenly distributed across force types. However, the effect size was small (Cramer's V = 0.118), suggesting that force type was only weakly related to injury.

Standardized residuals help identify which categories contributed most to the association. Impact weapon incidents were strongly overrepresented among injury cases and underrepresented among non-injury cases, indicating a higher-than-expected likelihood of injury. Hard empty hand control and firearm incidents also showed modest overrepresentation among injury cases. In contrast, soft empty hand control incidents were overrepresented among cases with no injury and underrepresented among injury cases, suggesting a lower-than-expected association with injury. Chemical or Taser incidents showed similar but weaker patterns.

Overall, certain force types (most notably impact weapon uses) were more frequently associated with officer injury, while soft empty hand control was less frequently associated with injury. Nonetheless, the relationship was relatively weak, and the chi-square test reflects associations only. These patterns may be influenced by the broader context of incidents, including resistance level or encounter severity, rather than the force type alone. Even so, the results indicate that officer injury did not occur uniformly across force categories and that impact weapon incidents warrant particular attention.

### 5.8.8 Precinct × Force outcome severity

**Figure 10. Proportional bar chart – Precinct by Force Outcome Severity**




To examine whether force outcomes varied across precincts, a chi-square test compared precinct with the ordered type of force used. The association was statistically significant, $\chi^2 = 95.21$, $p < .001$, indicating that force types were not distributed uniformly across precincts. However, the effect size was very small (Cramer's $V = 0.097$), meaning that precinct was only minimally related to force level in substantive terms.


Standardized residuals help identify which precinct–force combinations contributed most to the association. Madison was strongly overrepresented in firearm incidents, with Midtown Hills also showing higher-than-expected firearm uses and some elevation in soft empty hand control. West Precinct showed positive residuals for both firearm and impact weapon uses. In contrast, Central and East precincts were overrepresented in hard empty hand control incidents. South, North, and Hermitage showed modest overrepresentation in chemical or Taser uses.

Overall, these results indicate modest precinct-level differences in force outcomes, driven largely by a few specific combinations (most notably firearm incidents in Madison and hard empty hand control incidents in Central and East). Still, the effect size suggests that precinct played only a limited role in explaining variation in force levels.

These findings should be interpreted cautiously. The chi-square test identifies association, not causation, and precinct differences may reflect differing call types, incident characteristics, staffing, enforcement patterns, or reporting practices rather than consistent behavioral differences across precincts. Nevertheless, the presence of some variation in force severity across precincts may warrant additional review.

### 5.8.9 Officer gender × Force outcome severity

Figure 11. Proportional bar chart – Officer Gender by Force Outcome Severity




To assess whether officer gender was associated with the level of force used, a chi-square test was conducted comparing officer gender with the ordered type of force used. The test found a statistically significant association between these variables, $\chi^2 = 13.21$, $p = .013$. This indicates that the distribution of force types differed somewhat by officer gender rather than occurring uniformly across male and female officers. In other words, force outcomes varied by officer gender to a limited extent.


The effect size for this relationship, measured using Cramer's V, was 0.073, indicating a very weak association. This suggests that although the relationship was statistically significant, officer gender was only minimally related to force outcome in substantive terms. Put differently, there were some measurable differences in the types of force associated with male and female officers, but those differences were small overall.

Male officers were overrepresented among hard empty hand control incidents and underrepresented among soft empty hand control incidents. Male officers also appear somewhat overrepresented among firearm incidents. Female officers, by contrast, were overrepresented among soft empty hand control incidents and underrepresented among hard empty hand control incidents. Female officers also appear somewhat overrepresented among chemical or Taser incidents and somewhat underrepresented among firearm incidents, though these deviations are more modest.

Taken together, these findings suggest that officer gender was associated with force outcome, but only weakly. These findings should also be interpreted cautiously. The chi-square test and residual plot identify association, not causation, and the observed differences may reflect differences in assignment, training, team composition, call type, or other contextual factors not captured in this analysis. Even so, the results suggest that some variation in force outcomes by officer gender was present in the data, though the overall relationship was small.

### 5.8.10 Officer race/ethnicity × Force outcome severity

**Figure 12. Proportional bar chart – Distribution of Force Type by Officer Race/Ethnicity**




To assess whether officer race/ethnicity was associated with the level of force used, a chi-square test was conducted comparing officer race/ethnicity with the ordered type of force used. Officer race/ethnicity was not significantly associated with the level of force used, $\chi^2 = 13.71$, $p = .088$. Further, the effect size was very small (Cramer's $V = 0.052$), indicating a negligible relationship. Although the heat map of standardized residuals shows minor over- or underrepresentation in certain race/ethnicity–force type combinations, these patterns are only descriptive in value and should not be interpreted as meaningful. Overall, force outcomes did not vary in a substantively significant way by officer race/ethnicity in this dataset.

## 6. DISCUSSION

This review places MNPD's use of force within the context of Nashville's broader history of public concern, civilian review, and demands for accountability and transparency. This context is crucial for guiding our analyses and interpreting what story the data may tell us. Use of force records are not merely administrative documents. They reflect how force is defined, reported, reviewed, and understood within a larger system of policy, training, supervision, and public expectations. Therefore, it is important to note that the findings presented in this report speak not only to 2024-2025 force activity itself, but to the strengths and limitations of MNPD's current transparency and accountability framework.

As stated previously, the descriptive analysis of 2024-2025 use of force instances shows both continuity and change. The overall volume of recorded force remained relatively stable across both years, but force continued to be concentrated among a relatively small number of force types, resistance categories, precincts, and demographic groups. Subject-level records remained concentrated among male subjects and younger adults. Black subjects accounted for 57% of subjects of force, compared with about 26% of Davidson County's population, a disproportionality index of 2.20 (Table 1b) that is nearly unchanged from the 2.21 reported in 2024. Population share is a limited benchmark because it does not account for differences in how often residents come into contact with police; the 2024 report also compared

force with arrest and suspect data, a comparison this review did not repeat. Officer-level records remained concentrated among male, White, non-Hispanic officers and officers with one to five years of service. Officer-level records were concentrated in a few precincts and zip codes, led by Central Precinct (19.1%) and zip code 37201 (10.1%). These patterns reinforce a central point raised in the background and literature review: force is not distributed evenly, and meaningful oversight requires sustained attention to who experiences force, where it occurs, and how it is recorded.

Data quality is equally central to what these findings reveal. One of the clearest shifts between 2024 and 2025 was the increased use of Soft Empty Hand categories, alongside declines in categories such as Take Down, Hard Empty Hand Control, and Grappling (Tables 2, 3, and 13b). That shift may reflect a real change in practice, but it may also reflect a change in classification. Either possibility is important. As the literature review showed, transparency is not enough if the categories or labels used are not clear and consistently applied. Nashville has improved the visibility of force data, but visibility without consistency remains an incomplete form of accountability.

The bivariate analyses serve to sharpen the descriptive takeaways. Force severity did not vary randomly. It varied in patterned ways depending on the reported reason force was used and the resistance type officers reported encountering. Incidents coded as defense of self and those involving weapon-related assaultive resistance were more likely to involve higher-severity force, while lower-level resistance categories were more often associated with lower-level force.

These results suggest that, generally, force severity tracked with incident context in recognizable ways. At the same time, they show why accurate classification matters: since force severity varies meaningfully by resistance and justification, the clarity around the use of those categories is central to assessing necessity, proportionality of force used, and compliance with MNPD policy.

It is also worth noting that not all of the bivariate relationships we examined were equally strong. Years of service, officer gender, and precinct showed only weak relationships with force severity, and officer race/ethnicity was not significantly associated with force severity in our analysis. This finding differs from the NCRB's 2024 report, which found that white male officers were more likely than non-white and non-male officers to use higher levels of force and to cause subject injury (Section 1.4.3). The gender association found here (male officers overrepresented in hard empty hand control and firearm incidents) points in the same direction as the 2024 finding, though it is very weak.

These findings must also be read alongside MNPD's response to prior NCRB recommendations. In 2024, the NCRB issued twelve recommendations to MNPD aimed at strengthening reporting practices, improving accountability mechanisms, promoting equitable policing, and increasing transparency. As of this review, MNPD has not issued a formal written response outlining actions taken. An assessment of MNPD's current Use of Force Policy (Title 11.10, Response to Resistance, revised July 2026) and publicly available data indicates partial progress, with implementation varying substantially across thematic areas. Several structural and evaluative components necessary for sustained accountability remain incomplete or unaddressed. The persistence of these gaps across reporting cycles itself constitutes another finding.

Finally, the policy reviews in Section 4, comparing alignment between MNPD's policy, NACOLE's principles, and the Berkeley Police Department's policy, help bring this picture into focus. MNPD's current policy addresses most of the subjects that national standards cover, including objective reasonableness, sanctity of life, de-escalation, the duty to intervene, deadly force restrictions, and reporting. However, meaningful implementation gaps remain. Those gaps are consequential, as they involve the populations most affected by force, the mechanisms through which officers are held accountable, and the structural relationship between the department and the NCRB. Addressing them does not require wholesale policy restructuring. Rather, it requires targeted changes that bring MNPD's written policy and its accountability infrastructure into full alignment with what the national best practice standards require.

Across all of these dimensions we arrive at the same conclusion: while MNPD has improved its transparency with regard to use of force, accountability demands more than measurement. It requires clear definitions, consistent reporting,

rigorous review, meaningful policy response, and a sustained commitment to learning from data and making reforms that are informed, enacted, and durable.

## 7. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The following recommendations are drawn from the findings of this report and from three reviews of MNPD's policy: the status of the NCRB's 2024 recommendations, the alignment of Title 11.10 with NACOLE's Twenty-Three Principles for an Effective Use of Force Policy, and a comparison with the Berkeley Police Department's Use of Force policy. Each recommendation draws on at least two of these reviews. Several appear in this report for the second time, as they were not addressed or implemented following the NCRB's 2024 use of force report. Each recommendation also identifies the Title or Titles of MNPD's Department Manual it would affect.

### Recommendation 1: Strengthen Force Classification and Coding Practices

The year-to-year shifts in recorded force categories are large enough that they may reflect changes in classification as well as practice. MNPD should clarify category definitions across all force reporting forms, reinforce classification guidance through training, and conduct routine audits to ensure that changes in the data reflect changes in practice rather than documentation drift. Supervisory review should include an affirmative check of whether the force category recorded is internally consistent with the resistance type, reason for force, and narrative account in each report.

This recommendation is driven by current report findings and aligns with NCRB 2024 Recommendations 1 and 2a, and with NACOLE Principles V and XXI, which require standardized, comprehensive, and externally auditable force reporting. Definitions for each category of force used should be made clear and consistent across all of MNPD's RTR Module and 108 forms. The definitions themselves should come from MNPD Title 11.10.020: Definitions Specific to Use of Force.

### Recommendation 2: Revise Force Authorization Language to Affirmatively Require Proportionality

MNPD's current policy authorizes force that is "necessary and reasonable," a standard that meets the constitutional floor established in Graham v. Connor but does not expressly go beyond it. Berkeley's policy, for example, requires that force be objectively reasonable, objectively necessary, and proportional, and states that this standard is more restrictive than the constitutional minimum (Berkeley Policy 300.1.2). MNPD should revise its force authorization language to enumerate proportionality as a separate, affirmative requirement. This revision would strengthen alignment with NACOLE Principle I and signal a departmental commitment to force minimization that goes beyond legal compliance.

Supervisory review of force reports should also be recalibrated accordingly, examining whether the reported resistance, justification, and force type align in a clear and defensible way, and going beyond a check of whether documentation is complete.

This recommendation aligns with NCRB 2024 Recommendations 2a and 4b and with NACOLE Principle I, and corresponds to Berkeley Policy 300.1.2 (use of force standard) and Core Principle 300.1.3(B) (proportionality). Adoption of this recommendation would affect MNPD's RTR Module, the Critical Incident Review Board, and the reports of MNPD's Quality Assurance Manager. It would also affect MNPD Title 10.10 Internal Audit for all audits done on Use of Force incidents.

### Recommendation 3: Adopt a Standalone Vulnerable Populations Provision

MNPD's policy currently has no standalone provision requiring officers to exercise heightened consideration before using force against vulnerable populations. Berkeley's policy addresses this directly, designating children, elderly persons, pregnant women, people with physical and mental disabilities, and people with limited English proficiency as

groups warranting particular sensitivity in force decisions (Berkeley Policy 300.1.3(E)), and requiring training on vulnerable populations (300.10(a)). MNPD should adopt an equivalent standalone provision within Title 11.10.

This is among the most consequential gaps in MNPD's current policy given the share of subjects under 18 documented in this report (8.1% in 2024–2025), the absence of youth-specific force guidance identified in the 2024 recommendations, and the continued absence of disability- and age-related force considerations in the core policy. MNPD's pain compliance guidance should also be expanded into a dedicated subsection with an explicit requirement that techniques be discontinued once compliance is achieved and with specific guidance for interactions involving youth, people with disabilities, and others for whom standard application poses heightened risk.

This recommendation aligns with NCRB 2024 Recommendations 5 and 6 and with NACOLE Principles II, IV, VI, VII, and XIII. It corresponds to Berkeley Policy 300.1.3(E) (vulnerable populations), 300.3.5 (pain compliance techniques, including discontinuing a technique once compliance is achieved), and 300.10(a) (training). Berkeley's pain compliance section does not include population-specific guidance. NACOLE Principle XIII adds that officers should continuously evaluate whether a lack of compliance is due to physical, mental, or language limitations, and Principle VI calls for additional consideration with vulnerable populations; this element of the recommendation draws on those principles. MNPD should adopt a standalone vulnerable populations provision within Title 11.10, Response to Resistance.

### Recommendation 4: Strengthen De-escalation, Procedural Justice, and Training Depth

MNPD policy emphasizes de-escalation as a core principle, but the policy does not explicitly incorporate cultural humility training, neighborhood-specific bias awareness, or formal procedural justice instruction. De-escalation concepts are present, but there is no indication that these approaches are delivered as structured, recurring training modules or evaluated through performance assessment. MNPD should revise its de-escalation section to treat CIT deployment as a policy-level directive when available and practicable, rather than an optional consideration, as Berkeley's policy does (Berkeley Policy 300.3.4). Training should explicitly include procedural justice elements: active listening, nonverbal communication, word choice, and rapport-building.

The concentration of officer-level force records among officers with one to five years of service makes early-career training a clear area for continued attention. Because this report could not compare these figures with the share of officers in each years-of-service group, the concentration may partly reflect assignment patterns. The department should also establish community-engaged training models and peer accountability mechanisms that reinforce the principles of de-escalation and procedural justice in practice, extending beyond what policy language alone can achieve.

This recommendation aligns with NCRB 2024 Recommendations 5, 7a–7b, 8, and 10 and with NACOLE Principles VI, VII, and XX. It corresponds to Berkeley Policy 300.3.4, which directs that a CIT officer, crisis negotiator, or mobile crisis team member be called upon when available and practicable, and lists rapport-building, voice intonation, and body language among de-escalation techniques. Neither Berkeley's policy nor NACOLE's principles set a procedural justice training requirement; that element of this recommendation draws on the NCRB's 2024 recommendations. MNPD should strengthen Title 11.10.030(N), De-escalation, and 11.10.190, Use of Force Training. It would also affect MNPD Title 17.10 Training Standards.

### Recommendation 5: Incorporate Fair and Unbiased Policing as an Affirmative Force Standard

MNPD's use of force policy contains no provision explicitly requiring that force decisions be made in a fair and unbiased manner. Berkeley's policy includes such a principle among its core principles, cross-referencing the department's Fair and Impartial Policing policy (Berkeley Policy 300.1.3(G)). Given the racial disparities in force outcomes documented across multiple reporting cycles, adding an explicit fair and unbiased policing principle to Section 11.10 would anchor

broader reform commitments at the policy level and establish bias-free force as an affirmative standard rather than an assumed one.

This recommendation aligns with NCRB 2024 Recommendations 7a, 8, and 12, and corresponds to Berkeley Core Principle 300.1.3(G). MNPD should add an explicit fair and unbiased policing principle to Title 11.10, Response to Resistance.

### Recommendation 6: Adopt an Affirmative Vehicle-as-Force Prohibition

MNPD's policy restricts shooting at moving vehicles and prohibits officers from placing themselves in a vehicle's path, but it does not address the offensive use of a police vehicle as an impact or ramming tool. Berkeley's policy fills this gap with a dedicated section prohibiting the use of police vehicles to ram or block other vehicles, persons, or moving objects in a manner that reasonably appears to constitute lethal force, except where deadly force is authorized (Berkeley Policy 300.5). It separately defines blocking and ramming (300.1.4) and limits the Vehicle Containment Technique to stationary or slow-moving vehicles (300.5). MNPD should adopt equivalent language establishing a clear, affirmative prohibition on vehicle ramming as a distinct force category.

This recommendation aligns with NACOLE Principle XVIII and has no counterpart in the 2024 recommendations. It corresponds to Berkeley Policy 300.1.4 (definitions of blocking and ramming) and 300.5 (use of vehicles); NACOLE states the same prohibition without Berkeley's exception for circumstances that justify deadly force. MNPD should add definitions of blocking, ramming, and vehicle containment to Title 11.10.020, Definitions, and add a standalone section on the use of vehicles as force to Title 11.10, Response to Resistance.

### Recommendation 7: Strengthen Officer-Level UoF Monitoring Within the Early Intervention System

MNPD operates an Early Intervention System (EIS) under Title 2.30 of its Department Manual. The system assigns each sworn employee a daily risk score built from complaints, discipline, leave, assignment, calls for service, arrests, use of force reports, and other data, and compares employees with their peers (2.30.020(A), 2.30.050(A), 2.30.060). Scores at or above the 95th percentile generate an alert to the employee's chain of command, and scores at or above the 98th percentile require a documented supervisory assessment (2.30.030(C), 2.30.060(B)–(D)).

As designed, the current EIS treats use of force as one input to a composite score. It does not compare the force an officer uses with the resistance recorded, sets no force-specific indicator or threshold, and leaves the response to an Advisory Alert to the supervisor's discretion (2.30.070(A)). Its criteria and annual evaluation are reviewed internally, and EIS information is confidential (2.30.030(I), 2.30.060(E), 2.30.110, 2.30.120). As a result, neither the public nor the NCRB can determine whether the system identifies officers with frequent or disproportionate force. This report found 12 officers with 10 or more use of force records in 2024–2025 (Table 11); whether any received an EIS alert is not known.

MNPD should add a force-specific component to the EIS: an indicator comparing each officer's force with the resistance recorded, as the NCRB recommended in 2024, with a defined review threshold and a required documented review when that threshold is met. Title 11.10 should cross-reference the EIS so that RTR Module data feed it explicitly. Annual officer-level force reviews should be incorporated into performance evaluations, with attention to officers whose force patterns diverge from department norms after accounting for assignment and workload. MNPD should also report annually, in aggregate and without officer identifiers, the number of force-related alerts issued and how they were resolved.

This recommendation aligns with NCRB 2024 Recommendations 3 and 4b, and with NACOLE Principles V and XXI. It would affect MNPD Title 2.30, Early Intervention System; Title 11.10, Response to Resistance (11.10.200 and 11.10.210); and Title 17.10, Training Standards.

### Recommendation 8: Codify NCRB Data Transparency, Complaint Visibility, and Joint Annual Policy Review

Three structural accountability provisions are absent from MNPD's current policy and should be adopted together, as they collectively define the institutional relationship between MNPD and the NCRB:

- NCRB Data Access: MNPD should restore NCRB's access to non-confidential use of force databases to enable independent annual auditing and reporting. The current structure, which limits the Board to publicly available dashboard data, constrains the depth of analysis required to fully assess patterns, disparities, and accountability outcomes. Berkeley's policy requires its use of force analysis to be provided quarterly to the city's Police Accountability Board and published quarterly on the City's Open Data Portal (Berkeley Policy 300.11.1).
- Civilian Complaint Visibility: MNPD's use of force policy should incorporate a standalone provision directing members of the public to the NCRB for force-related complaints. Making complaint portal access a visible, standardized feature of the policy itself, rather than infrastructure that exists only outside of it, matters for public trust and equitable access. Berkeley's policy states that complaints related to the policy may be filed with the department's Internal Affairs Bureau and/or its Police Accountability Board (300.12).
- Joint Annual Policy Review: MNPD should adopt a requirement that Section 11.10 be reviewed annually in collaboration with the NCRB, with findings documented and made available to the public. Berkeley's policy requires the department and the Police Accountability Board to convene at least annually to review and update the policy (300.13).

This recommendation aligns with NCRB 2024 Recommendations 2b and 11 and with NACOLE Principles XXI, XXII, and XXIII, and corresponds to Berkeley Policy 300.11 through 300.13. The gap appears in all three reviews in this report. MNPD should adopt a standalone passage on collaboration with the NCRB regarding use of force data, complaint visibility, and joint policy review in Title 11.10, Response to Resistance.

## 8. CONCLUSION

This report finds that MNPD's use of force patterns in 2024 and 2025 were marked by both continuity and notable change. The overall volume of recorded force remained relatively stable, but force continued to be concentrated among a relatively small number of force types, resistance categories, precincts, and demographic groups. The statistical analyses showed that force severity was meaningfully associated with the reason force was used and the type of resistance reported, while associations with officer demographics and precinct were weaker. The central policy questions revealed by these findings concern how force decisions are made, documented, supervised, and reviewed, not officer characteristics in isolation.


These findings do not determine whether force was justified in any individual case. They do show where patterns are stable, where they are shifting, and where Nashville's current accountability framework remains incomplete. Several patterns identified in 2024 persist in the 2024–2025 data, including the overrepresentation of Black subjects relative to their population share (Table 1b). MNPD has not issued a formal written response to those recommendations. That absence is itself a finding.

The eight recommendations in this report extend and sharpen prior priorities, now grounded in 2024–2025 data, an alignment analysis against NACOLE's Twenty-Three Principles, and a comparison with the Berkeley Police Department's written use of force policy. Several represent targeted, drafting-level policy revisions that require no significant operational disruption. Recommendations 2 through 6 and Recommendation 8 have direct counterparts in Berkeley's policy, which shows that the language they call for is already in use in a department's manual.

Nashville and MNPD have made real progress in measuring force. The public dashboard exists. Reporting has expanded. That progress should be acknowledged and built upon. A written MNPD response to the recommendations in this report, documenting actions taken, actions planned, and the timeline for both, would itself be a meaningful step forward.

# APPENDIX

Map 1: 2025 Use of Force Incidents by Zip Code in Nashville




Map 2: 2025 Use of Force Incidents by RPA (Reporting Area)





Table 15. Force Used by Subject Race (2024-25)

| FORCE TYPE | BLACK | WHITE | OTHER | SUBJECTS (N) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Soft Empty Hand | 52% | 47% | 1% | 269 |
| Grappling | 60% | 40% | 0% | 25 |
| Chemical Spray | 75% | - | 25% | 4 |
| Taser Deploy | 62% | 34% | 4% | 223 |
| Tear Gas | 100% | - | - | 1 |
| Other Physical | 46% | 46% | 8% | 13 |
| Take Down | 60% | 39% | 1% | 173 |
| Hand Strikes | 48% | 48% | 5% | 21 |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Knee Strikes | 63% | 38% | - | 8 |
| Foot Strikes | 61% | 39% | - | 28 |
| Other Weapon | 25% | 75% | - | 4 |
| Baton | 100% | - | - | 1 |
| K9 | 56% | 44% | - | 39 |
| Firearm | 75% | 25% | - | 4 |

Table 16. Officer YOS – Number of Force Interactions per Individual Officers

| OFFICER INTERACTIONS | 0-1 YOS | 1-5 YOS | 6-10 YOS | 11-15 YOS | 16-20 YOS | 21-25 YOS | MORE THAN 25 YOS | TOTAL OFFICERS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 27 | 109 | 53 | 36 | 20 | 9 | 10 | 264 |
| 2 | 24 | 83 | 26 | 10 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 150 |
| 3 | 13 | 52 | 18 | 5 | 2 | | | 90 |
| 4 | 5 | 32 | 12 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | 53 |
| 5 | 4 | 21 | 5 | | | | | 30 |
| 6 | 2 | 11 | 1 | 1 | | | | 15 |
| 7 | 2 | 5 | 6 | | | | | 13 |
| 8 | 1 | 6 | 1 | | | | | 8 |
| 9 | | 6 | 2 | | | | | 8 |
| 10 | | 3 | | | | | | 3 |
| 11 | | 2 | | | | | | 2 |
| 12 | 1 | 5 | | | | | | 6 |
| 24 | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |

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